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vLURIS&IC£IQMl»_STA^ 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Sec. 78-2-2(3)(i). This appeal is from an Order of the 
trial court dismissing the Plaintiff's cause of action because of 
the Plaintiff's failure to diligently prosecute. 
NATURE_0£_THE_PROCEEDLE&£ 
A. The Plaintiff sued the Rushton's oyer the right of 
Possession of Property Rushton's acquired from an execution by 
the State of Utah and a sheriff's sale thereon October 1, 1980. 
B. The Defendants Rushtons sued the State of Utah as a 
Third Party Defendant, claiming a right against the State if the 
State conducted sheriff's sale was determined invalid. 
C. The State of Utah as a Third Party Defendant and 
thence Third Party Plaintiff sued Reed Maxfield, Plaintifff now 
as a Third Party Defendant on a claim that Maxfield's claim of 
interest was based on fraud, and if the State were found liable, 
they had a valid cause of action against ..axfield for 
indemnification. 
D. Plaintiff Maxfield filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in 
Federal Court, naming his claim against Rushtons fet-Slj. as an 
asset of his debtors estate. The Plaintiff, as debtor, assigned 
his interest in the Third District Court action to a family-owned 
companyf Utah's Great Game Preserve. The assignment was approved 
as part of the plan or reorganization for the debtor, Maxfield. 
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E. The matter of the legal action between Maxfield and 
Rushtonf £t-.aLjLf was referred back to Third District Court. 
F. A final trial setting was set on September 15, 
1987f in Third District Court with pretrial set August 31, 1987. 
G. Utah's Great Game Preserve, successor in interest 
to Maxfield and as moving Plaintiff appeared by counsel at 
pretrial along with all other counsel and Mr. Maxfield, and after 
a hearing the trial judge dismissed the entire case for failure 
ot Plaintiff to diligently prosecute the matter. 
- 2 -
L£&Q£&-QK-AE££AIL 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
dismissing the Plaintiff's causes of action for failure to 
diligently prosecute. 
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error 
in denying Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment based upon the 
pleadings, affidavits, and factual circumstances surrounding this 
transaction. 
3. Whether the trial court committed reversible error 
in denying Plaintiff's Motion For An Order Granting Plaintiff The 
Immediate Right to Redeem prior to the trial of the case on its 
merits. 
4. Whether the trial courts dismissal for failure to 
prosecute extinguished Plaintiff's claim of superiority over bona 
fide purchasers when Plaintiff's interest was being challenged as 
fraudulent in nature. 
£TATUTORy_£RQVISIQNS 
None. 
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&TATEMENT_QE_THE_£A&£ 
Plaintiffs1 action was dismissed at a final pretrial 
for the failure of the Plaintiffs to diligently prosecute the 
case, which action was originally filed in the Third District 
Court on October 20, 1980 (R 437-438). This is an appeal from 
the dismissal of that action. 
The original action concerned the right of the 
Rushtons, Defendants/Respondents to two pieces of real estate 
purchased at a sheriff's sale (R 35, 41), and their right and 
priority in the property as against a previously executed but 
unrecorded deed to Maxfield, a partner in an alleged fraudulent 
transfer from an alleged defective corporation. The corporate 
and individual deeds were recorded on said properties after an 
appeal in the Utah Supreme Court was denied to the original 
conveyor, Lester R. Romero, in March, 1980. Romero was the 
unsuccessful defendant in the Supreme Court Appeal on the 
original judgment against him before Judge Condor in District 
Court in an action in welfare fraud in 1979. D^&rtment_o£. 
&acial_&eE.vices_2A._Rgnietaf 609 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1980). 
This is now a continued action on appeal by the 
assigneef Utah's Great Game Preserve (R 269, 438-448), from the 
assignor, Reed Maxfield, from a Chapter 11 proceeding filed by 
Reed Maxfield in Federal Bankruptcy Court, on December 10, 1984. 
The Chapter 11 proceeding included, in part, the assignment by 
the debtor, to preserve to his estate and to the assignee, his 
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&TATEMENT_OF_FAQTg 
The S t a t e m e - * • 5 
i . , s , M ^ I - i j r t y 
Defendant and Co-Respondent State 1 ar. i le.ts t> a^t- a 
statement ' * * j 4 *-* j , 3 
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2. The Third Party Defendant/Respondent adopts by 
reference herein the Statement of Facts numbers 12 through 25 of 
the Defendant/Respondent Rushtons1 statement of the case, pages 7 
through 9. 
3* Utah's Great Game Preserve/ as a result of an 
assignment from Maxfield to this family-held corporation is the 
party/plaintiff, and represented by Attorney Charles Brown (R 
268-271). 
4. The Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment; denied the Defendants' Motion to Dismissf on April 1, 
1981 but at the same hearing granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend 
Rights of Redemption for six months beyond the conclusion of the 
litigation (R 62). 
5. Plaintiffs' second request for Summary Judgment was 
heard by Judge Dee on September 25, 1984; said Motion was denied 
(R 215). 
6. The case on Defendants' request, dated February 4 
and 17, 1984f was set for trial on April 30, 1984r at 10:00 a.m. 
(R 82-89). 
7. On a request of June 19, 1984, the case was set for 
trial on September 10, 1984 (R 90), and Defendant Rushtons' 
counsel, Mr. Nygaard, filed a Motion to Compel Answers and 
Production of Documents on September 5, 1984 (R 180). 
8. Another delay occurred and a third trial setting 
was scheduled on September 25, 1984, for January 10 and 11, 1985 
(R 215). Judge Dee denied another Motion for Summary Judgment by 
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Both Defendants and Third Party Defendant/Respondent filed 
objections to Plaintiffs1 request for a continuance dated August 
11 and August 14f respectively (R 378 and 382). 
14. Motions from all parties were heard on August 24, 
1987 and the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss claims 
against Plaintiff and denied Plaintiffs' motion to file a Third 
Amended Complaintr and also denied Third Party 
Defendant/Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment (R 43 6). 
Plaintiffs' motion to continue the trial date had been previously 
denied (R 424) . 
15. The final pre-trial hearing was held on the 31st 
day of August/ 1987. A lengthy pretrial conference was attended 
by the Plaintiff/ his two attorneys/ Mr. Charles Brown and Mr. 
Jeffrey Brownf Mr. Henry Nygaard representing the Rushtonsf and 
Mr. Tanner and Mr. Schwendiman and Mr. McGee representing the 
State of Utah. Attorneys for Maxfield renewed their motion to 
file a Third Amended Party Complaint adding parties and changing 
the theory to a civil rights action, as well as their motion to 
continue the trial date. Judge Young denied said motions again 
at the pretrial conference. Attorneys Brown then stated that 
without the Third Amended Complaint and additional discovery/ 
they were not prepared to go to trial on behalf of Plaintiffs and 
made a motion to withdraw as counsel (R 437f 438-448). 
16. Plaintiffs' counsel also then told the Court that 
they had not been paid nor had they been able to reach an 
agreement as to their fee arrangement for the representation of 
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&UMMARI_QF_AR£UMENT£ 
EQINT_I: BI &MI£SAL^EQR^E&ILI2EE _IQ_EEQ£ECU IE 
This action was filed in October, 1980, as an action to 
set aside an execution sale. After initial motions and 
pleadings, Plaintiff took no action for the years 1982 and 1983. 
Defendants requested Trial settings in 1984, 1986, and 1987. 
State of Utah requested Trial settings in 1987. .Four Trial 
settings had been set, Appellants not being ready to proceed at 
any of the settings, continuously seeking more time. No action 
was taken for the years 1985 and 1986. It was Defendants and 
State of Utah pushing for Trial - Appellants acknowledged not 
being ready to proceed after seven years. The court did not 
abuse its discretion. 
E QI NT _JLI: NQ^ERROR _I N _D EN Y LNQ_SUMM ARY _J U DGMENT 
The placing of the conveyance in issue as based on 
fraud with accompanying affidavit and the premature nature of the 
Motion before an Answer had been filed and before discovery was 
complete was sufficient reason to deny Appellants Motion For 
Summary Judgment. Parties against whom Summary Judgment is 
sought have a right to inference in their favor - which was 
appropriate in this case. 
EQINT_III: QRDER^ALLQWINQ^REDEMETIQS 
The courts order of redemption was effective as to 
Appellant for any right that he can establish that he has. That 
right of redemption began to run on August 31, 1987, The date 
- 10 -
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EQLHT_I 
THE COURT ACTED APPROPRIATELY 
IN DISMISSING THIS ACTION WHEN 
APPELLANTS WERE NOT READY TO PROCEED 
TO TRIAL AFTER SEVEN YEARS. 
IN SO DOING, THE COURT DID 
NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
Counsel for Appellants urges this court to believe that 
the Trial Court arbitrarily and without basis in fact dismissed a 
matter that should not have been dismissed. This not only 
distorts the true picture, but is a simplistic misrepresentation 
of the record. As the State has pointed out in its statement of 
facts and as will be emphasized throughout this argument, this 
matter has been pending for s.evg.Q_yg.ac.s. During that seven years 
there have been four trial settings (R 89, 90, 215, 309), the 
latest being in September 1987 when, Appellants and their counsel 
told the court they were not ready to proceed. The injustice 
caused to bona fide purchasers of property through Appellants1 
failure to prosecute the matter, after such an extended period, 
was and continues to be highly prejudicial and damaging to 
Defendants and Third Party Defendants State of Utah. Such a 
delay and unpreparedness is without excuse. The court acted 
properly when it dismissed the case. 
In their brief, Appellants aver that it was 
inappropriate for the Trial Court to dismiss the action on its 
own motion. This statement is made amidst partial fact as 
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court's usage of dismissal for failure to prosecute. Among other 
thingsf this court relies heavily on the ••record" of what has 
happened in the case to the point of the dismissal. A 
determination must also be made as to the action/inaction, 
preparation/non preparation of each party to the action. 
The five criteria against which any matter is judged 
was set forth in Ut^ h_Qil_C.Q.niEany:^ v*.^ Hatris.f 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 
1977). They are as follows: 
1. The conduct of both parties. 
2. The opportunity each has had to move 
the case forward. 
3. What each of the parties have done to 
move the case forward. 
4. What difficulty or prejudice may have 
been caused to the other side. 
5. And, most important, whether 
injustice may result from the dismissal. 
At the center of each of these c r i t e r i a i s the ana lys i s 
of the factual s e t t i n g . This court , for example, held against 
several defendants because they a l so had an ob l iga t ion to move 
the cases forward and did not do s o . Such was the case in WnigJak 
^L^Hfiwe, 150 P 956 (Utah 1915) , igJiasgn^v^Fitebtani^lQC^, 571 
P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977) , and DepattmeQt^fi£^£2G.ial^£ty:i£e£^YjL 
Efimetg, 609 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1980) . 
The record of the instant case, however, clearly 
establishes that the Defendants Rushtons and the Third Party 
Defendant, State of Utah, have with regularity made effort to 
move the matter to trial, only to be delayed by the Appellants. 
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A third trial setting was set for January 10-11, 1985 
(R 215), before Judge Dee, but just three weeks before that date. 
Appellant Maxfield filed bankruptcy proceedings which in effect 
stayed the proceedings in State Court and vacated the trial 
setting (R 260-263). Appellant Maxfield did nothing in 
Bankruptcy Court to pursue his claim against either Defendant, 
yet assigned whatever claimed interest he had to Utah's Great 
Game Preserve, a family held company. Defendants Rushtons were so 
frustrated in the delays and lack of activity on the part of 
Appellants and the length of time that had passed that they filed 
a readiness for trial in November 1986 in the State District 
Court (R 264-467), and even though the matter was still in 
Bankruptcy, Plaintiff's counsel filed a written objections with 
the court on November 28, 1986 (R 268-271) stating that he had 
not had time to familiarize himself with the case (even though he 
had been involved in the Bankruptcy since at least March, 1986, 
and had attended a settlement discussion with counsel for 
Defendants and the State in June of 1986). He had discovery to 
do (which he waited a year to do) (R 316) and that he had no 
financial agreement with Plaintiff (which was the case when he 
filed his request for withdrawal in August, 1987 (R 438-448)). 
It wasn't until the State of Utah filed a request in Bankruptcy 
Court on January 2, 1987, which was later amended (R 368-371) for 
permission to proceed to trial that Judge John Allen ruled that 
there was no stay and that the Appellants should proceed in state 
court (R 279-280). Said ruling came on February 25, 1987, after 
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which the statef that same dayf filed a request for immediate 
trial setting in state court (R 272-274). 
Even then, it was the State of Utah and Defendants 
Rushton who moved for trial (R 272-274)f when they filed their 
request for trial setting on April 27, 1987 (R 291-293), not 
Appellants. Instead of seeking to move the matter along. 
Appellants filed another "Objection to Hearing on Motion for 
Immediate Trial Date And Other Motions now Pending" on May 18, 
1987 (R 303-305). Therein Appellant Maxfield stated that he was 
not capable of handling the matter by himself - that he needed 
the aid of an attorney (his previous attorney had withdrawn (R 
285-286, 306-307) and Defendants had given him notice to obtain a 
new one (R 289-290)). 
The Court rejected Appellants1 objection, and at a 
scheduling Conference on June 1, 1987, set a September 15, 1987 
Trial date as a firm date with all discovery and motions to be 
cut off on August 17, 1987 (R 308-315). Immediately prior to the 
cutoff date, Appellants moved for continuance of- the trial date 
to yet do more discovery (R 337-334, 355-358). At the final 
trial and pretrial conference, counsel for Plaintiff stated they 
were not ready to proceed to trial and withdrew as counsel. At 
the pre-trial, Appellant Maxfield personally spoke to the issues 
and did not in any way indicate to the court that he was ready or 
that he wanted to move ahead without counsel. 
The Appellant's submission of an affidavit to this 
court six months later saying that he was ready to proceed 
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without legal counsel is self-serving, not part of the record and 
was not made known to the lower court, even when Appellant 
Maxfield, through his former counsel, objected to the proposed 
Order of dismissal and through new counsel Edwin Guyon orally 
argued the Objection (R 458-459, 470). This court has long held 
that issues not raised in the lower court cannot be raised for 
the first time on appeal. This attempt to circumvent his lack of 
action at the time the court made its ruling must be rejected. A 
similar attempt was summarily rejected by this court in M&&field 
XjL-Eishler, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975). In that case, Plaintiffs 
appeared for trial without an expert witness and ill prepared to 
proceed to trial after only two years. The Court dismissed the 
matter for failure to prepare and prosecute the claim with 
reasonable diligence. On appeal, the Plaintiff's counsel stated 
that he "could have proceeded" using the parents only and without 
an expert. The Court rejected this self serving statement in the 
following terms: "The record does not show that a request to so 
proceed was ever made." In the instant case, the record is also 
void of any such request since it was never made. The court was 
well within its powers and sense of justice to the Defendants to 
dismiss this matter after seven years and four trial settings 
when the Appellants (who had known since June 1, 1987) knew that 
trial was set. Instead of preparing, they wanted another 
continuance and were not ready to proceed. 
This court in the case of Tfrompson^ Dj$.gfr_j£g_mi>any_v^  
Ia£li&QQ# 29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528 (Utah 1973) upheld the 
- 18 -
dismissal of an action filed in 1964 for failure to prosecute 
when, after 8 years the matter had not been resolved and 
settlement discussions had not resolved the issues. This Court 
was clear that the entire "record" needed to be surveyed to see 
what the circumstances were. The court found that Plaintiff had 
not been misled by Defendants and that the record established 
that after the length of time in question, the Plaintiff had been 
dilatory in his responsibility to move the matter forward. 
A complete review of the record will reflect that other 
than the initial actions in the fall of 1980 and spring/summer of 
1981, Appellants have always basically sat back doing little 
other than "reacting" to the Defendants attempts to get the case 
tried. It is true that Appellant Maxfield filed for Summary 
Judgment in the summer of 1984 (R 91-92) and that some discovery 
was done later that year (R 142-150, 198, 203). Appellant then 
let the matter sit for almost three more years. It was 
Defendants and Third Party Defendants that kept pushing the 
matter to a firm trial date through and including September 1987. 
The State of Utah is perplexed that Appellants now 
assert that they somehow were "active" on the case when the 
entire record shows they were not prepared and basically fought a 
resolution. The State of Utah was ready and pushing for trial in 
April 1984 (R 82, 89), September 1984 (R 90), and January 1985 (R 
215). Then, the State along with the other Defendants were 
pushing since February, 1987 (R 368-371, 272-275, 291-3) and 
ready to try this case in September 1987. Throughout this entire 
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process^ Appellants have never been ready to try this matter, 
even attempting to change the theory of the case after seven 
years by filing a motion to amend one month before trial and by 
requesting a second time at pretrial the court's permission to 
file a Third Amended Complaint (R 404-421). The Court rejected 
this attempt to amend once again (after such a lengthy amount of 
time had passed) and held the Appellants to proceed on the 
earlier pleadings (R 436). Even at that. Appellants weren't 
ready to proceed to trial on the earlier pleadings though three 
previous trial settings had been set and the fourth one was known 
over three months before the final pretrial conference where 
Appellants and their counsel admitted lack of preparedness. 
The case of WestinghQuse_Electrjc_Supply_Cpmpany y^ 
Paul_Wt_Latsen_CIanttactgc.i._IaQ.*.f 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) helps 
to focus attention on that which is important in the instant 
case. In that case, the Court reversed a dismissal for failure 
to prosecute, because the Plaintiff made a reasonable effort and 
compliance within a three year period. 
The Court looked at the conduct of both parties and 
found that there was a reasonable excuse and unusual 
circumstances that justified the behavior of the plaintiff. The 
court held that the Trial Judge therefore abused his discretion 
in that the totality of the circumstances did not justify the 
decision. The court pointed out, that while the Plaintiff was 
not overly faultless at his lack of activity, the Defendant had 
allowed the matter to lie dormant and was not anxious to move the, 
matter forward. That is certainly not the case here. 
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This court acknowledged in We.s.ting.ka\i££ that reasonable 
latitude and discretion is to be afforded the trial court. The 
length of timef while not being the sole determiner of the 
court's actions, must be coupled with such activities that would 
warrant a dismissal. In Utah Oil Company.the Court looked at the 
•'reasonably excusable" activities of the Plaintiff in determining 
that a sixteen month delay was not sufficient. 
Appellant Maxfield, in the instant case, has no 
reasonable explanation, other than a trail of former attorneys 
that he has not been able to work with (R 285-286, 438-448, 
Supreme Court file containing withdrawal of Guyon), broken 
promises to those attorneys, numerous avenues of delay without 
any clear objective of what he wants as far as a course of 
direction for the litigation as is evidenced by the Withdrawal 
Affidavit and Motion that was filed by two of his counsel at the 
Pre-trial in August 1987 (R 438-448). It is not the Defendant 
Rushtons, nor the State of Utah's fault that Appellants are is in 
the position they are in. 
As one looks at the criteria set forth in U£§.h_Oil, the 
bona fide purchasers have been tremendously harmed, prejudiced 
and continue to be held hostage to a Plaintiff that now claims he 
was prepared, but has not shown in seven years that he is ready 
to go to trial - even when he is on notice of when the trial is 
scheduled. The State has likewise found it difficult to find 
witnesses, several of them having moved out of state, and others 
whose purpose is to support the defense of fraudulent and/or non-
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valid transfers of the deeds in question, because of the 
countless delays created by Plaintiff. Yet, the State pushed to 
move forward, because this matter must come to an end some time. 
It is certainly prejudicial and harmful to the State in its 
ability to challenge the validity of the deed transfer and every 
aspect of this matter due to the dilatory tactics and actions of 
Appellants. 
Defendants, likewise, have been in possession of the 
properties and have had to repair, rent, pay taxes, etc. on the 
properties for these seven years with only a counterclaim against 
Plaintiff to show for all of the money and effort they have 
placed in the property. At some point of time the matter has to 
end. Appellants, by the record, have never been ready to resolve 
the matter. The record is also clear that so much money has been 
placed in the properties by the Defendants, that at this point of 
time, even if Appellants would win at trial, the offsets under 
the counterclaim would be so great that there would little or no 
recovery by them; all of this because Appellants have not 
proceeded with diligence. 
Several of the cases previously cited by the State in 
this Brief, have factual situations that are less compelling than 
the current case, yet the court sustained their dismissals. In 
tlaxfiald a complaint was filed in 1972 and depositions were taken 
in 1973. The Defendant in that case requested a trial setting. 
Plaintiff objected to the trial request. Plaintiff further did 
not submit answers to Interrogatories until after a motion to 
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compel and five days before trial . The Plaintiff knew months 
before of the trial setting, yet asked for a continuance 
immediately prior to trial. This was denied. The attorney for 
Plaintiff then admitted that they did not have an expert for 
trial. The matter was dismissed. The only issue that seemed to 
give this Court trouble was that an expert witness was not 
absolutely necessary for the trial to proceed/ even though it was 
clear that they were not prepared. 
In Wilson, the Court recognized that the Plaintiff had 
ample notice of trial setting and his unpreparedness after a 
series of other events justified the dismissal. A Complaint had 
been filed in 1968 with little or no action until 1973. Trial 
was set for 1973 and postponed because of illness of the 
attorney. Trial was next set for 1977 with plaintiff moving to 
vacate the trial setting. The Court issued an Order To Show 
Cause for failure to Prosecute. The Court did not dismiss, but 
set for trial setting a third time. Nine months later, the Court 
dismissed the matter because Plaintiff was on no.tice of the trial 
schedule and was not prepared to proceed. 
A similar case to the present circumstances was in 
KA.L*.CJ. where the action was filed in 1967 and after a failed 
Motion to Dismiss, a counterclaim was filed and the matter set 
for trial the following year. Summary Judgment was denied, 
counsel withdrew and a new trial setting was established for 
1968. There was no action for several years. A third trial date 
was set for 1976 which was delayed for further discovery. A 
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fourth trial setting was established and the Plaintiff moved for 
dismissal on his claim and against Defendant for failing to 
prosecute his counterclaim* The court agreed stating that the 
facts of that case justified the dismissal. 
Each of the three above cited cases, as well as other 
cases herein point out that: (1) there were several trial 
settings where the moving parties should have been prepared; (2) 
there were periods of time where no action had taken place on the 
case; (3) extended periods of time had gone by from the filing of 
the case until the dismissal; (4) the parties were on notice of 
the trial dates and scheduling and therefore had no excuse for 
not being ready to proceed; (5) the parties against whom the 
dismissal was made really had no justifiable reason for not being 
ready; (6) The parties against whom the dismissal was made 
claimed at some point of time that they wanted to proceed, 
several even filing motions for continuance before the scheduled 
trial setting; (7) the withdrawal of counsel at some point of 
time in the process did not relieve the moving party from the 
obligation of moving forward. 
While these seven points are somewhat different from 
the criteria set forth by this court to analyze such situations, 
they do point out some common threads that this case has with 
these, where dismissals were upheld. When viewed as a whole, 
comparing both the circumstances of the previous cases with the 
current case, Judge Young not only appropriately, but with 
reasoned discretion dismissed the case. The Judge was familiar 
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with the 4-5 inch thick file, had reviewed what had taken place, 
listened to the parties, hearing from Plaintiff personally, and 
realized that Defendants Rushtons and the State had been and were 
once again ready to proceed and the Plaintiff was not. After 
seven years and sufficient notice, the action the court took was 
appropriate and justified. 
In looking at the common threads as delineated above, 
there were; (1) four trial settings in this matter, most of which 
were either continued or postponed because of the actions of 
Appellants (R 89, 90, 215, 309); (2) there was no or little 
action for the years 1982, 1983 (R 81-82), 1985 and 1986 (R 255-
264), except for what Defendants had engaged in which was 
objected to by Plaintiff; (3) the case extended from October 1980 
through September 1987 at which time the Appellants were still 
unprepared to go to trial, still seeking more continuances 
(R 355-358), discovery (R 355-358), and seeking to amend the 
complaint for the third time (R 404-421, 436); (4) Plaintiff had 
been on notice since February, 1987 that both Defendants Rushtons 
and the State of Utah wanted and were seeking immediate trial 
settings. The case had gone on long enough and they wanted it to 
proceed. Appellant Maxfield even objected to these requests (R 
309)* On June 1, 1987, Appellants were on notice once again that 
trial would be held. This time, in a £ion_£irst pl^cer trial 
Setting, for September 15-16, 1987 (R 309), 3k months in the 
future. Cutoff dates for all motions and discovery were set at 
that time (R 309)• When those deadlines came. Appellants still 
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sought more time and a continuance of trial date (R 355-358); (5) 
Appellant Maxfield offered no excuse for not being ready, other 
than they didn't like the work of his attorneys who asked to 
withdraw because Appellant had misled them, had not entered into 
agreements with them relative to fees, and was displeased with 
their performance (R 438-448)• This action on the part of 
Appellant Maxfield two weeks before trial certainly should not be 
used to create further injustice to the bona fide purchasers of 
the property who would be further damaged by this inexcusable 
behavior on the part of Appellant with his counsel; (6) Appellant 
Maxfield contends now that he wanted to proceed and would have 
had he been given an opportunity, yet the record is silent and 
Appellant never did make such a request. His own counsel said 
that he was not ready to proceed, and Appellant had written in 
May, 1987 that he could not proceed without counsel because he 
was not capable of doing so (R 303-305), and; (7) there had been 
withdrawal of counsel on two occasions which had nothing to do 
with Defendants Rushtons or the State (R 285-286, 438-443). This 
was a matter between Plaintiff and his attorneys. 
On one occasion, this Court overturned a dismissal for 
failure to prosecute because the Trial Court had itself misled 
the parties because of failing to notify the parties of a trial 
date. £&§. EQ!&_YL*._l££LS.# 561 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1977). In X11QID&S.QD. 
Hit£fcf the Court found that the Plaintiff had not been misled by 
the Defendant in settlement negotiations and therefore could not 
use that for an excuse as to his inaction. In the present case, 
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there is no evidence either that the Court or Defendants Rushton 
or the State of Utah misled Appellant. After seven years, with a 
known trial date set at which the case was scheduled to "go" and 
which was being pushed by both Defendants and Third Party 
Defendants, Appellants simply were not ready and didn"t even know 
what theories they wanted to push. Even his attorneys did not 
want to go to trial an_tlie_is.&u§.§.-.ttli.Q-bg.tfiiLg._the_GQ.U.tt (R 43 8-
448). (Emphasis ours) 
Based on the foregoing, Third Party Defendant, State of 
Utah urges this court to recognize the lack of attention and 
failure to pursue his claim that is so obvious. Certainly, the 
Trial Judge, having been familiar with the record, acted in a 
responsible manner as was encouraged by this Court in Bxask§.£.. 
Counsel has not been able to find a clear definition by 
the Utah Supreme Court of what constitutes "abuse of discretion" 
as might be applicable to this case. That is the standard that 
this court has set forth in such a review. Many jurisdictions, 
however, have grappled with this concept. The Michigan Appeals 
Court in Pfi.Qpl§_v^Wol£ckgn, 2 Mich.App. 186, 139 N.W.2d 123 
(Mich.App. 1966) stated: 
The term discretion itself involves the idea 
of choice, of our exercise of the will, of a 
determination made between competing 
considerations. In order to have an "abuse* 
in reaching such determination, the result 
must_b&_go_palEa^i^^§Qd-st&££ly.^y:iQiativfe_fi£ 
£a£i_aQSi_loai£ that it evidences not the 
exercise of will but perversity of will, not 
the exercise of judgment but the defiance 
thereof, not the exercise of reason, but 
rather of passion or bias. (Emphasis added) 
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The Wyoming Supreme Court added a further clarification 
in Wa!d££E-£jL_Wea£g£r 702 P.2d 1291 (Wyo. 1985) wherein the court 
said: "An abuse of discretion is that which &kgck&_tk§_£Qnsci§.nQ£ 
of the Court and appears so unfair and inequitable that a 
t£as.aaabl§._Be.L§.Q.a^ Q.o^ ld_QQLt^ a^ idg.-.it.,, (Emphasis added). This 
position was also accepted by the Louisiana Appellate Court in 
&G.b.ueLg.t-Y.±.^ Sc.liu.e.l£tf 460 So.2d 1120 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1984) when 
it held that: "Abuse of discretion is defined as such abuse as 
S.llQG.!lS._tllg—£Q.n§.g.ig.nQ.e of the court. It must appear so unfair and 
unequitable that t£asfiQable^ E^ t&QCL§._gauld-.afit^ afeid£-.it* * 
(Emphasis added). 
Counsel for Third Party Defendant, State of Utah, was 
able to locate a case from the Ohio Court of Appeals that dealt 
with interpreting "abuse of discretion" in terms of a dismissal 
for failure to prosecute a case. In that case, SchiL£iQ£t^ X.j-
K&Lsgn, 52 Ohio App.2d 219, 369 N.E.2d 800 (Ohio App. 1977), the 
court sua sponte dismissed an action. While recognizing that 
such actions are severe and that the facts must warrant the 
action, the court stated that "An abuse of discretion implies an 
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable attitude by the court." 
This guideline needs further clarification. This Court 
in QafcL£L_£*_Iadtt&tti^ 84 Utah 428, 36 P.2d 
95 (Utah 1934) stated: 
It would seem the words "arbitrarily" and 
"capriciously" are used merely to 
characterize a conclusion, when the 
conclusion is announced with no substantial 
evidence to support it or a conclusion 
contrary to substantial competent evidence. 
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The Wyoming Supreme Court in La_RfeJi£££JkaLaSLi£# 457 
P.2d 498 (Wyo 1969) held that "arbitrary* meant -willful and 
unreasoning action, without consideration and regard for the 
facts and circumstances presented, and without adequate 
determining principle," The Court of Appeals for Kentucky in 
Ilitttffian-£jL.ttetidianJttutuai-lafiutaQC£-CfiniBanXf 345 s.w.2d 635 (Ky 
1961) stated that: 
By "arbitrary" we mean clearly erroneous, and 
by "clearly erroneous" we mean unsupported by 
substantial evidence. By "unreasonable" is 
meant that under the evidence presented there 
is no room for difference of opinion among 
reasonable minds. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court in R£&ding_v._Gibb§., 203 
Neb. 727, 280 N.W.2d 53 (Neb 1979) stated: 
. . . In Domus [Domus Realty Corp. v. 3440 
Realty Co., Inc., 40 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1943)] the 
court defined the terms "oppressive" and " 
unconscionable" as follows: "Tested by 
ordinary definition and by common 
understanding, 'oppressive' means conduct 
that is unjustly burdensome, harsh or 
merciless and 'uagga§.Q.ieiiabl£l_in£aaS.-GfiQdU£t 
that_is_monstL&Us;^ 
tfi_the_conacienc.e • " (Emphasis added). -
From the above definitions of "arbitrary," 
"unreasonable," and "unconscionable" it is clear that Appellants 
have not met their burden. Certainly, the record shows the 
attention paid by Defendants Rushton and Third Party Defendant, 
State of Utah and the inaction and delay on the part of 
Appellant. Judge Young had a record replete with information 
from which to make a rational, reasoned decision that the 
Appellants had failed in their obligation to carry the matter 
forward to conclusion. 
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Appellants cite only a narrow selective part of the 
record to argue that the Court abused its discretion* Their 
argument is hollow and unpersuasive when the "entire" record is 
reviewed. The State has attempted to point out what Judge Young 
had before him. Appellants have cited nothing that comes close 
to meeting the burden of establishing that the action "shocks the 
conscience" or is "palpably and/or grossly violative of fact and 
logic;" that is arbitrary, unreasonable, unconscionable, or with 
which a "reasonable person" would not agree. The facts as 
presented above and as are found in the 7 year record are clear 
and straight forward. The Defendants Rushtons and the Third 
Party Defendant State of Utah, have been ready and pushing for 
the matter to be heard. They have resisted continuances (R 378-
379, 430-435) and further amendments that would have delayed this 
matter further. Plaintiff/Appellant was not ready to try the 
case, had no valid excuse, and was simply dilatory in his 
actions. 
As this Court amply stated in Tho&psgn JDi.tG.ii, the 
entire record must be surveyed to determine whether there is a 
basis on which to sustain the lower court. Such a survey reveals 
reasonable, logical and judicious exercise of the inherent powers 
of the court. The actions of the Lower Court should be sustained 
and this matter ended. No injustice will result by sustaining 
the lower court. The bona fide purchasers will finally be able 
to take what has been theirs for seven years. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Third District Court's denial of Appellants Motion 
for Summary Judgment on the 27th day of March, 1981 by Judge 
James Sawaya and the subsequent denial of the filing of a third 
amended complaint, as part of this record, sustain further the 
rightfulness of the dismissal by Judge Young of this action in 
chief, for failure to prosecute. J^nkins^v^Taone, 27 Utah 2d 
17, 492 P.2d 980 (1972) held that validity of deeds created an 
issue of fact which precluded summary judgment. 
Rulings on motions for summary judgment are not 
reversed by the Appellate Court unless there is clearly an abuse 
of discretion or the trial court is in error as a matter of law. 
The burden is upon the moving party, and the defending party is 
given the benefit of every doubt in order to ensure that parties, 
if legally deserving, shall have their day in court. 
The Appellant argued that the first Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed before an answer had been filed or any discovery 
had taken place was error as a matter of law. The Defendants 
Rushtons were only aware that they were innocent purchasers of 
real property being sold by the Sheriff of Salt Lake County to 
enforce a judgment. 
On March 27, 1981, the Court heard arguments on 
Defendant Rushtons1 Motions to Dismiss and Plaintiffs1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Court denied the Motion for Summary 
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Judgment upon the grounds that it was premature (R 52). The 
Plaintiff filed an Intermediate Appeal (R 104-106). The 
Intermediate Appeal was denied. 
The Plaintiff/Appellant argues that the Affidavit filed 
by Rushtons' counsel does not adequately raise questions of law 
of fact to successfully challenge the Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgement. This argument was denied by the trial court 
because the State of Utah had not been joined a necessary party, 
the Defendants Rushtons were innocent bona fide third-party 
purchasers under a sheriff's saler and that the relationship 
between Maxfield and Romero raised a question as to the validity 
of the deed from Romero to Golden Circle Investment Corp., to 
Maxfield. 
Secondly, there had been inadequate time to complete 
discovery. 
Next, Third-Party Defendants/Respondent State of Utah, 
should have adequate time to file an answer to raise the legal 
issues of fraud, joinder and the validity of the purported deeds 
of conveyance. 
The Court's denial of the Motion for Summary Judgment 
based upon the above rationale is fully supported by prior 
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Defendants were e n t i t l e d to have a l l the evidence 
and inferences construed in the ir favor. In Bgw££_x.JL_Riv££tfin 
CLifcXr 656 P.2d 434 (1982) , the Supreme Court s tated at page 436: 
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If there is any doubt of uncertainty concerning 
questions of fact/ the doubt should be resolved 
in favor of the opposing party. Thus, the 
court must evaluate all of the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the 
opposing summary judgment. 
The Supreme Court has furthermore declared that an 
Affidavit is not even essential to successfully contest a Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Under Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P.: 
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing 
may serve opposing atfidavits, but is not 
required to do so. He may stand upon his 
pleadings providing his allegations, if proved/ 
would establish a basis for recovery. 
[GbLEi&teQ£gB_K^_£inaa£ial^S£t^i££-Cfi^-clQ£j-r 
337 P.2d 1010 (1963).] 
The Defendants Rushtons' Answer, Counterclaim/ and 
Third-Party Complaint joining the State of ^tah were filed 
immediately after the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was 
denied/ specifically pleading the issues with particularity as 
generally set forth in Defendants Rushtons1 and the State of 
Utahs' subsequent motions and pleadings and have fully 
established the existence of genuine issues between the 
Appellants and Defendants. 
Judge Sawaya properly denied the Motion for Summary 
Judgment as the pleadings clearly set forth the question as to 
title on the part of Appellant Maxfield/ and the Appellants have 
wholly failed throughout this protracted litigation to prove 
their title and/or interest and were not prepared to do so on 
August 31/ 1987/ and Judge Youngf based on the record and the 
representations at pre-trial/ acted properly in dismissing the 
action. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
FAILING TO ISSUE AN ORDER ALLOWING THE 
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION IN THE PLAINTIFF 
Judge Sawayafs Order of March 27, 1981, pte§exv£cL_£g> 
Appellant any right of redemption he may have in himself or 
through the original conveyor, Lester Romero or any of the 
alleged invalid corporate entities or partnerships through which 
Maxfield claims his chain of title* That right of. redemption to 
Appellant was granted until the end of February, 1988 as a result 
of the Order of Judge Young dated September 30, 1987 (R 449). 
Under Rule 69(f)(1) , U.R.C.P., those who can redeem are 
limited to: 
a) Judgment debtor; 
b) A creditor having a lien by judgment or 
mortgage on the property sold, on or some 
share or part thereof, subsequent to that 
on which the property was sold. 
Argument III, on pp. 14-16 of Appellants' Brief clearly 
misstates the facts and the law relative to redemption, and the 
Order of Dismissal by Judge Young on August 31, 1987 clearly sets 
forth that the right of redemption would run from that time 
forward. 
On November 30, 1984, Appellants' Motion relating to 
rights of redemption was argued and the Court reserved ruling 
until date of trial (R 230). 
On December 10, 1984, the Plaintiff filed a petition in 
bankruptcy, thereby staying further proceedings (R 260). 
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Under these facts and circumstances/ there is not a 
factual or legal basis for reversing the trial court's denial of 
the Appellants Motion for Summary Judgment, or its decision on 
the issue of the extension of the right of redemption. 
Appellants' contention that the failure of Judge David 
Dee to rule early precluded Maxfield's ability to so redeem is 
without merit. Third-Party Defendant and Co-Respondent State of 
Utah have clearly taken the position throughout the length of 
this protracted litigation that the right of redemption existed 
and that the Order of Judge Sawaya granted said extended right 
and that said right has existed all along until six months from 
August 31, 1987. 
POINT IV 
THE VALIDITY OF APPELLANT'S 
DEEDS/TRANSFER WAS NEVER 
ADJUDICATED IN THE LOWER COURT 
AND THE ISSUE OF THEIR STATUS 
IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE STATE'S LIEN 
IS THEREFORE IMPROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT 
Appellants raise in argument a claim that their 
unrecorded deeds took priority over the judgment obtained by the 
State of Utah when the property was in the name of Lester R. 
Romero, the Defendant in the welfare fraud trial that led to the 
judgment from which the execution took place. To support their 
abbreviated and unconvincing argument. Appellants misstate the 
record and cite no authority on point to support their position. 
Even assuming Appellants properly argued such a claim, 
it is improperly before this court since there has never been an 
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adjudication on the validity of the deeds Appellants rely on. 
The validity of the deeds in question and the precarious nature 
of Appellant Maxfield's relationship with Mr. Romero was placed 
in issue when Defendants Rushton filed their answer in April, 
1981 (R 53-56) • This was also the subject of discovery on the 
part of the Defendants and the Third Party Defendant State of 
Utahf and was heavily pled when Defendants amended their Answer 
in August 1984 (R 183-188) and when Third Party Defendants also 
clarified the Third Party Complaint in September, 1984 (R 204-
208)• The State of Utah and Defendants also maintained this 
factual defense as part of the answer to the second amended 
complaint that both filed (R 328-329, 390-394). 
The transfer and validity of the deeds in possession of 
Appellants has never been determined in Appellants' favor. This 
was an issue that was maintained by the Defendants and Third 
Party Defendant and pushed by them for inclusion in the defense 
of this action at trial. The only list of witnesses submitted to 
the court, as per the Court's request, was a list of witnesses 
submitted by the State of Utah (R 425-427). The bulk of those 
witnesses were for the purpose of establishing the improper 
conveyance and invalidity of the deeds upon which the Appellants 
rely. 
Because this was an issue to be tried, not only was the 
court proper in denying any summary judgment that was argued 
regarding it (R 52, 215), but Appellant's failure to prosecute 
the case brought to an end his claim under this issue since the 
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court dismissed Appellants' action. The Appellants have no 
legitimate issue to appeal. The lower court dismissed all of 
Appellants1 claims. The lower court's actions preclude 
Appellants from trying the issues before This court. The only 
legitimate issue for appeal is the court's dismissal for failure 
to prosecute. Since the court acted appropriately, responsibly 
and with sound judgment. Appellants have no further claim in this 
regard. 
This court should not render an advisory opinion which 
is exactly what Appellants are seeking. They are requesting this 
court to ignore the contested issue of the transfer and validity 
of the deeds, assume all is valid, and award judgment in their 
favor without the Defendants having an opportunity of presenting 
their evidence to disputed his claim of valid ownership. 
In Defendants Rushtons' Motion to Dismiss dated 
December 19, 1980, Defendants state in specific terms that 
Appellant " . . . Reed Maxfield must establish his relationship 
with Lester Romero • . .M (R 8-10). When the preliminary motions 
were denied and disposed of, Defendants were required to file an 
answer which they did on April 2, 1981 alleging that 
Plaintiff/Appellant is not only estopped from his assertion 
because of his fraudulent activity with Lester Romero, but that: 
Defendants specifically allege that Maxiigldi 
at^ng_ticie_had^aDy«tialatf.ul^iDt£t££t^ia^aQd. 
to_£fce_£ai<i_ELeE£Ltyr and that daaiiaas. 
between,Romero £nd Max£ield_were, fraudyleafc 
£n nature as a means of trying to prevent the 
State of Utah from knowing that Lester Romero 
was the true and correct fee title owner of 
said property. (Emphasis added) (R 53-56)• 
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The court is reminded that at the time Defendants filed 
their answer placing both the validity and transfer of the deeds 
in issue, the State of Utah was not a party to this action and 
had not been involved with any of the hearings or motions. It 
was only through a Third Party Complaint that Defendants, not 
Appellant, filed against the State that brought the state in as a 
party, albeit a Third Party Defendant (R 57-58) . This was the 
posture of the case through two trial settings (R 89, 90) and 
into a Third setting (R 215). Appellant Maxfield's attorney 
filed a motion for permission to file a Second Amended Complaint 
in December, 1984 (R 251-254) , approximately three weeks before 
the trial was to begin. At the same time he filed a Bankruptcy 
matter which stayed all proceedings (R 258-263)• 
This was over four years from the date of the sale (R 
10-11) and named the State of Utah and others for the first time 
as Defendants well beyond the statute of limitations. A hearing 
on Appellant's request to proceed on the Second Amended Complaint 
was not heard for quite some time after which both the State of 
Utah and Defendants were ordered to answer (R 308-314) • Both the 
State's and Defendants' answers to the Second Amended Complaint 
placed ownership of the property in question (R 322-329, 390-
394) . 
The dismissal for failure to prosecute the case ended 
Appellant's claim that he had a superior interest in the property 
to that of the State of Utah. Appellants were on notice since 
1981 that Maxfield's claimed ownership was being contested (R 53-
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56). Instead of prosecuting that claimf and being prepared for 
trial after seven years and four trial settings. Appellants now 
want this court to intercede and rule in their favor as a matter 
of law when it is an issue of fact they have never been ready to 
defend. For this Court to honor their request would be both 
improper and prejudicial to the State of Utah and Defendants who 
have always maintained that Maxfield's interest is both tainted 
and improper. 
For some reason, Appellants single this issue out for a 
ruling when it is no different from the other factual issues that 
were to go to trial on four different occasions - none of which 
Appellants were apparently ready for. It is, for example in no 
different position than Appellants' claim that the properties 
were not properly posted for execution, even though the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff filed an affidavit that they were (R 23-23A). 
These are factual issues that the Trial Court would need to take 
evidence on before a ruling could be rendered. Since there was 
no trial, since the Appellants were not ready to proceed, and 
since the Trial Court properly found that Appellants had not 
prosecuted the case with diligence, the case with all attendant 
factual claims was properly dismissed. 
Counsel for the State of Utah have not been able to 
find any cases exactly the same as that presented here on appeal. 
Most cases, including those from Utah generally deal with simply 
a judgment debtor and judgment creditor. In this particular case, 
however, Maxfield claims ownership from deeds given him two (2) 
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months prior to a trial (R 94) (in which he testified on behalf 
of Romero) (R 116-121), not disclosing he owned the properties in 
question (R 116-121) and holding them unrecorded until five days 
after this Supreme Court ruled against the grantor of the deeds 
in his appeal from welfare fraud and nine months after judgment 
was obtained which attached to the property (R 100-103) (§.££ 
DeEattffi£nt^o£_&Gcial_&aLvi£££^Z^EQm&LO# 609 P.2d 1323 (Utah 
1980) issued March 20, 1980 - deeds recorded March 25, 1980). 
The properties were then sold to bona fide purchasers (Rushtons)• 
The New Mexico Supreme Court has addressed a somewhat 
similar fact situation in the case of «Ie.£fet§L-Y.jL«E.ae.l.f 99 N.M. 
351, 658 P.2d 425 (N.M. 1982) wherein the court stated: 
[E]quitable principles require that the 
innocent purchaser should prevail over one 
who negligently fails to record a deed upon 
which he seeks to rely," 
The Colorado Supreme Court has taken a similar position 
and has been consistent throughout the many years that it has 
dealt with this subject. That Court in Pgpple._y._B!2cas
 y 435 P.2d 
894 (Colo 1968) reaffirmed its position in the early case of 
WL&L&UkJlh!m 47 Colo. 3 97, 107 P. 1081 
(Colo. 1910) wherein the court held that no unrecorded deed can 
operate to defeat the right of a judgment creditor who obtained 
the lien against real property prior to the recording of the 
deed. This position has also been taken by the Texas Civil 
Appeals Court on numerous occasions as well. See. XEE.&_fi£jL_5L 
Cte^it^Uaioa^VjL^galia/ 605 S.W.2d 381 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980), Saqle 
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Lpinbgr_Company._y^ __Tr^ jinhMif 365 S.W.2d 702 (Tex.Civ.App. 1963) , 
and &£&on&Ld_Y:^J?2K£ll_kunik££r 243 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.Civ.App. 
1951). 
While the Utah Supreme Court, in £ac, tgjmg i
 my, .g fcft fee JM Ta& 
Commig&iea, 4 Utah 2d 382, 294 P.2d 790 (Utah 1956), has given 
some indication that it might reach a different conclusion, the 
Court has never dealt with a situation such as the current one. 
The State of Utah and Defendants Rushtons allege that moneys 
Maxfield claims he paid were given to non-office holders of the 
companies in question, were paid to fictitious persons (for which 
no receipts have been produced, though promised in Maxfieldfs 
deposition of October 18, 1984) , involved properties the subject 
of welfare fraud* He was involved with Romero to the extent of 
acting as a holder of unrecorded deeds given to him immediately 
prior to trial as against the properties in question (as an 
effort to keep it away from the State), yet not recorded until 
five days after this court affirmed the Welfare Fraud Judgment 
against Romero. Romero continued to collect ren-ts after this 
purported property transfer until the properties were sold, when 
Maxfield suddenly appears to claim a superior interest. 
Certainly, KarfcckneE. did not deal with either facts like these 
and particularly with a third party bona fide purchaser such as 
Rushtons. 
The cases from our neighboring jurisdictions, cited 
above, while coming close to the situation presented here, set 
forth the best approach in handling those matters involving a 
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fact situation such as presented in this case. To allow 
otherwise encourages judgment debtors to "secretly" transfer 
properties prior to trial and have them recorded after they lose 
in years of appeals claiming they never had ownership at the time 
of judgment* Such a position is offensive to justice and 
fairness. 
Nonetheless, Third Party Defendant, State of Utah, 
strongly states that even reaching this issue is not necessary. 
As has been stated, the propriety and validity of any deeds and 
their transfer to Appellant Maxfield were placed in issue in 1981 
and have been continuously contested by the State of Utah and the 
Rushtons from the beginning of this action. What the law is in 
Utah or other jurisdictions is at this point of time irrelevant 
since this issue is not ripe for review by this court. The 
Appellants seek only to offset their dilatory and neglectful 
actions in failing to prosecute this matter to conclusion by 
requesting and expecting this Court to entertain the above 
discussed issue sua sponte and decide issues as a matter of law 
even though they have never been heard at trial. 
In their Brief, Appellants cite little to support their 
view that this court should step in now. What they do state is 
misleading, since (1) fraudulent activities as it relates to the 
property in question has been raised against Appellant from the 
beginning of this action; (2) there is evidence in Appellant's 
own deposition and other discovery that consideration was not 
bona fide and was not even paid to the party who claimed 
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Charles C. Brown, Esq. 
Benneficial Life Tower #2000 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
William Thomas Thurman, Esq. 
McKay, Burton & Thurman 
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Stephen C. Schwendiman 
Assistant Attorney General 
130 State Captiol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Lorin N. Pace, Esq. 
University Club Bldg. #1200 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DATED this It day of November, 1986. 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Henry feJ Nygkard 
Attorney for Defendants 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
(801) 328-2506 
NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES 
Any objections to the foregoing certification or any 
disagreement to any of the matters certified are to be filed 
in writing with the Court within ten days of the date hereof, 
served upon all parties, and noticed up for hearing upon the 
law and motion calendar. 
The foregoing Certificate is to be used in the Third 
Judicial District Court as the Request for Trial Setting provided 
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TO THE DISTRICT COURT: 
Henry S. Nygaard, attorney for defendants Owen A. Rushton 
and Carol Rushton, by his signature below hereby certifies that 
in his judgment this case is ready for trial and in support of 
such certification counsel represents to the Court as follows: 
1. That all required pleadings have been filed and 
the case is at issue as to all parties. 
2. That counsel has completed all discovery; that opposing 
counsel have had reasonable time to pursue discovery; and that 
all discovery of record has been completed. 
3. That if medical testimony is contemplated or required, 
copies of all existing medical reports have been made available 
to all counsel or parties of record. 
A. That there are no motions that have been filed which 
remain pending and upon which no disposition has been made. 
5. That reasonable discussions to effect settlement 
have been purused by counsel and their clients but no settlement 
has been effected. (Such discussions are to be realistic in 
nature and not limited to an unresponded to offer. The duty 
to effectively negotiate lies with all parties.) 
6. Jury trial is waived. 
Counsel further hereby certifies that the following 
counsel or pro se parties of record were furnished with a copy 
of this certificate on the 19th day of November, 1986, whose 
last known addresses and telephone numbers are as follows: 
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HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. #2435 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Attorneys for Defendants 
333 North 300 West Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
v-. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
REED MAXFIELD, : 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and : 
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife, 
Defendants . 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and 
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife, 
vs . 
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Third Party Defendants 
CERTIFICATION OF 
READINESS OF TRIAL 
Civil No. 80-8167 
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Third Party Defendants 
and Third Party 
Complainants, 
vs. 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Plaintiff and Third 
Party Defendant. 
U 
•J^-y 
- i -
Minult BOOK rorm iiw 
Cuunty of Salt Lake - State of o/tafa f L M i * H 
Pfc.nlitt 4* 
pfc«i 
Defendant 
CASE NO: C£*>8lk"7 
Type of hearing: Div 
Present; Pltf 
Annul. 
Deft._ 
Supp. Order_ OSC._ Other_ 
Summons^ 
Waiver. P. Atty: W l i p t E l ^ Z ^ 
D. Atty: S t e f h ^ w V W x y f ; v>sa^ f % w A * / p \ u g ^ V n Default of Pltf/Deft Entered 
Sworn & Examined: ° v 0 Date: ff-2g-ft4* 
Pltf: Deft: Judge: t^MfTd fe^Da^f 
Stipulation. 
Publication. 
Others: Clerk:^k ten LUo^ 
Reporter- P & V l r t v J W W ) 
Bailiff: ClSVKhM^VTv. LOn . Sfl^bsr-
ORDERS: 
D Custody Evaluation Ordered 
D Visitation Rights 
D Custody Awarded To 
D Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $ x 
D Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $ 
• Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office: 
= Per Month 
Per Month/Year D Alimony Waived 
• Atty. fees to the 
D Home To: 
in the amount of. • Deferred 
D Furnishings To: 
• Each Party Awarded their Personal Property 
D Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations 
• Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children 
D Restraining Order Entered Against. 
. Automobile To: 
D Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $_ 
• 90-Day Waiting Period is Waived 
G Divorce Granted To As 
D Decree To Become Final: D Upon Entry 
• Former Name of 
D 3-Month Interlocutory 
. Is Restored 
D Basea on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court 
orders / shall issue for Deft _ 
Returnable . Bail. 
D Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, 
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
M Based on wct&utip«taici»of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, court orders 
^[\g^-^pXjatK"tAj[,%^ A^v^rfio^ ^ 4 e y ^ i v w y u * / w m 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS: 
County of Salt Lake ) 
LINDA L. McGRATH, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Beaslin, Nygaard, 
Coke & Vincent, attorneys for Owen A, and Carol Rushton herein; 
that she served the attached Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Answer 
Interrogatories and to Produce Documents upon the following indi-
viduals by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Lorin N. Pace 
Pace, Klimt, Wunderli & Parsons 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Bernard Tanner 
Steve Schwendiman 
Assistants Attorney General 
State Capital Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84141 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the 
Q - day of ifc^ re-t, 1984. 
Linda"!. McGrath 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
Nptary P u b l i c ~ 
Residing^at Salt Lake City, UT 
My Commission Expires: 
The defendants, by and through their attorney, Henry S. 
Nygaard, of the law firm of Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, 
hereby moves the Court pursuant to Rule 37(a) 2 and 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to answer the interrogatories submitted 
to the plaintiff and its counsel and the Request for Production 
of Documents that have been file for more than thirty (30) days. 
The defendants further request, if appropriate, the 
court order the plaintiff to reimburse the defendants for costs 
and attorney's fees incurred. 
DATED This <^<J day of August, 1984. 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Henry S. Nygaard 
Attorney for Defendants 
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HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Attorneys for Defendants 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone: 328-2506 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, . 
STATE OF UTAH 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL 
RUSHTON, his wife, 
Defendants. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL 
RUSHTON, his wife, 
vs, 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Utah State Department of Social 
Services, 
Third Party Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Utah State Department of Social 
Services, 
Third Party Defendant 
and Third Party Complaintant, 
vs. 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Plaintiff and 
Third Party Defendant. 
MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF 
TO ANSWER INTERROGATORIES 
AND TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS 
Civil No. 80-8167 
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receiving copies of the documents in this case on May 22, 1981, 
from Henry Nygaard. 
Jte^ 
DATED this 20 day of May, 1981. 
li^fes 
Assistant Attorney General 
STATE OF UTAH 
) ss: 
County of Salt Lake) 
Stephen G. Schwendiman, being first duly sworn according 
to law, deposes and says: That he is the affiant herein; that 
he has read the foregoing affidavit and knows the contents 
thereof; and that the same is true of his own knowledge, except 
as to matters therein alleged upon information and belief; and 
as to those natters, he believes them to be ture. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^  ' ~* cay of 
May, 19 61. ^ - — - - ^ V \ 
My Commission Expires: 
/ /W.: Notary Pablic " ~ 
Residing in Salt Lake County, 
Utah ' 
of Utah determined not to attempt an execution during the appeal 
process even though no stay against such proceedings was issued. 
6. That immediately after this court affirmed the trial 
court, Mr. Romero and plaintiff had recorded deeds to the pro-
perties in question which bear the date of April 1979, but had 
net been recorded until after this court had issued its opinion. 
7. That prior to execution, counsel for Mr. Romero and 
affiant discussed possible settlement options, none of which 
cane tc fruition. 
8. That affiant requested and did receive a preliminary 
title report in the summer of 1980 relative to two parcels, which 
were subsequently sold at sheriff's sale. Said report listed 
Mr. Maxfield as fee owner. 
9. Affiant had conversations with the renters at the 
properties being sold, who indicated that notices had properly 
beer posted and shoving interest in said properties for possible 
purchase. 
10. Affiant also had conversations with the Salt Lake 
Ccirty Sheriff's office relative to posting and notice and was 
given verbal co^firration that all was m order. 
11. Tnat affiant did knew that Mr. Maxfielc had filed an 
action against the Rasntcns and nad talked with Attorney Nygaard 
relative to the background cf t.ne case. At no tine, hovever, 
did tne State cf Utah receive copies of any pleadings, an\ 
nct.ces, nor was the State cf Utah ever ]omed as a part\ until 
ii vas served with a complaint b\ the Rushtons in April, 1981. 
12. Tr.e State of Utau did not >»no* of any saniTiar\ }udc-
re:*: hearing until after it was completed, and did not know of 
the issues therein involved. 
13. That the State of Utah, who did in fact prosecute 
the sale, would need to present its evidence as to the issues 
involved, now knowing what the issues of the suit are bv 
SZZ-T.EU G. SCKi £ CDIMAN 
.-.:s:stant Artorney General 
256 Stare Capitol" 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 64114 
Tel*-hone: 533-5261 
IK THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE 0? UTAH 
:CX?IELD, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
r\* A RUSKTON &-& CAROL 
. fr.TCN, his wife, 
Deferdants and 
Respondents. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF STATE OF UTAH'S 
OPPOSITION TO INTER-
MEDIATE APPEAL 
No. 17719 
Stephen G. Schwendimar, having been duly sworn on oath, 
states as follows: 
1. That he is an Assistant Attorney General for the 
Stare of Utah. 
2. That in June 1979, he prosecuted a welfare fraud 
action against Lester R. Romero in the Third District Court for 
Sair Lake Co^rzy, State of Utai, obtaining }udgrent on behalf of 
the State, plus costs, in an amount totalling $15,958.78. 
3. That at the tire of trial, the Stare of Utah intro-
duced evidence fror the recorders and treasurers cffices of 
Salt Lake Count} that Lester Fc.Tero vas even then Curie 1977) 
rne owner of property, the sutoect of the action filed by Mr. 
raxfield. 
4. That plaintiff Maxfield was called as a witness for 
Mr. Romero and neither he, nor Mr. Romero ever declared that 
the property had been transferred. 
5. Tnat Mr. Romero appealed that judgment and the State 
£~XM/8t i~ (f 
oo jof 
^aia^x-jW^ 
Plaintiff(s), 
vs 
Defendant(s). 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
CASE NO. 020- <tU1 
Pursuant to the scheduling conference held on OUvir> 1 (» ( » uA 
the following dates were set and matters discussed: ' 
1. This case is set for trial on: (1st place): (3rd)~~ 
(2nd place): r1«iOkJ (4th) -
2. Anticipated trial time^js _ ' TTUlD days. 
3. The case is set for C5^n^jjur^/jury) trial. It jury fee is 
not paid, it will be paid within 10 days of the date of this order by 
plaintiff/defendant. 
4. All discovery must be completed, including the filinp of 
depositions with the Court, by . 
5.r A final pre-trial will be held before the Court on 
i"B be ^£*Jr _at • .m. Counsel who will try 
the case are to be present. Clients or an individual with authority 
to settle are also to be present. 
6. Date to hear dispositive motions is 
7 Other matters 
8. Counsel are advised that they should contact the Court's clerk, 
Brad Willis, at 535-7506 at least one week in advance of a second place 
setting trial date to determine if the case will be tried as a second 
place setting. 
9. The foregoing dates should be considered firm settings and 
will not be modified without Court order and then only upon a showinp. 
of manifest injustice. 
10. This order constitutes the only notice that the Court will 
send to counsel. 
1 1 day of ^ Jt Dated this 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Copies of this scheduling order were mailed to the following 
parties at the addresses indicated: 
LftviK f W ^ r & £ . 5cu*k ICIIMAU
 f S i r . 9=fiU 
Dated 
Court/dlerk 
r\Dc 
i \ .' 1 W . \ %J§ \i* « 
V
 P l a i n t i V f ( s ) , 
JUilM J W v s t t v \ ui cAAX 
Defendant(s) 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
CASE NO. C&n-yitH 
Pursuant to the scheduling conference held on 
the following dates were set and matters discussed: j^m±. 
(3rd) 1. This case is set for trial on: (1st place): 
(2nd p lace) :ifr3frff4 (4th); 
2. Ant i c ipa ted t r i a l r i mg^  S s
 i_^ fiyyjL days . 
3 The case is set for Qion-jur^'^^^y) trial. If* jury fee is not paid, it will be paid within lu days of the date of this order by 
piaintiff/defendant. 
4. All discovery must be completed, including the filing of 
depositions with the Court, by — •—• . 
Affinal pre-trial will be held before the Court on 
'
W
 <^*7 . a tSy^L__/l •xn- Counsel who will trv 
the cascfareto be present. Clients or an individual with authority 
to settle are also to be present. 
6. Date to hear dispositive motions is 
7. Other matters: 
8. Counsel are advised that they should contact the Court's clerl 
Erad Willis, at 535-7506 at least one week in advance of a second place 
setting trial date to determine if the case will be tried as a second 
place setting. 
9. The foregoing dates should be considered firm settings and 
will not be modified without Court order and then only upon a showing 
of manifest injustice. 
10. This order constitutes the only notice that the Court will 
send to counsel. 
Dated this ^ day of tf$^>£ , 19 ^  V 
DAVTD R. DEE 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Copies of this scheduling order were mailed to the following 
pflrties at thc^addresses indicate^:
 t A Q A y ^(j^\2>t0^ e. addresses maicatexi: A Q A 
i^^MJtiu noo i^^j^^v^ loQph m\\ 328-gl5Q(b 
Dat ^rfi}Et5p9tt: 
1 II NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES 
2 
3 || Any objections to the above certification or any 
disagreement to any of the matters certified are to be filed in 
4 || writing with the court within ten days of the date hereof, served 
upon all parties, and noticed up for hearing upon the law and 
5 j[ motion calendar. 
The foregoing Certificate is to be used in the Third 
5 | Judicial District Court as the Request for Trial Setting provided 
in Rule 4.1 of the Rules of Practice of the District and Circuit 
7 |j Courts, effective March 1, 1982 
8 I BY THE COURT 
9 
10 
11 
5 
7 
9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
required, copies of all existing medical reports have been made 
available to all counsel or parties of record. 
4. That there are no motions that have been filed 
which remain ponding and upon which no disposition has been made. 
5. That reasonable discussions to effect settlement 
have been pursued by counsel and their clients but no settlement 
has been effected. (Such discussions are to be realistic in 
nature and not limited to an unresponded to offer. The duty to 
effectively negotiate lies with all parties.) 
6. Jury trial is waived. If demanded, $50.00 fee to 
11 ij be enclosed. 
12 I Counsel further hereby certifies that the following 
13 " 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
counsel or pro se parties of record were furnished with a copy of 
this certificate on the A day of February, 1984, whose last 
known address and telephone number is as follows: 
NAME ADDRESS TELEPHONE 
Mr. Lorin M. Pace 431 South 300 East 328-9623 
Attorney at Law Suite B-l 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED This 7 day of February, 1984. 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
7 1 i:< 
Henry S. Nygaard 
Attorney for Defendants 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
-2-
r::.i> 
'• ;u ( V? 
ji HENRY S. NYGAARD 
; BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & V INCENT 
:: Attorneys for Defendants 
,i 333 North 300 West 
! Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
1
 Telephone No. 328-2506 
FEB 10 2 5oPH.°? 
H.01X0K .'••; ERK 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKF COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
REED MAXFIELD, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and 
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife, 
Defendants, 
CERTIFICATE OF READINESS 
FOR TRIAL 
Civil No. (180-8167 
TO THE DISTRICT COURT: 
Henry S. Nygaard, attorney for Defendants, Owen A. 
Rushton and Carol Rushton, by his signature below hereby certi-
fies that in his judgnent the case is ready for trial and in 
support of such certification counsel represents to the Court 
as follows: 
1. That all required pleadings have been filed and the 
case is at issue as to all parties. 
2. That counsel has completed all discovery; that 
opposing counsel has had reasonable time to pursue discovery; and 
that all discovery of record has been completed. 
3. That if medical testimony is contemplated or 
- 3 
any way, interfering with Defendant's tenants, or in any way 
receiving any rentals in the future. 
WHERFFORE, the Defendants pray that the Court enter 
Judgment on the Counterclaim as follows: 
1. Defendants be awarded a Judgment in the sum of $800.00 
for rents improperly retained by the Plaintiff. ] 
2. Plaintiff be ordered to refrain from in any way 
interfering with Defendant's tenants or obtaining any of the 
rents owing by tenant to the Defendant. 
3. Any other relief the Court deems just in the premises. 
DATED this / day of April, 1981. 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Henry; s/jfygaard 
Attorney for Defendants 
-2-
3. The Plaintiff's are estopped from making any claim 
against said property because of their fradulent conduct in 
connection with Lester Romero, and therefore, should be denied 
any relief. 
4. The Defendants further allege: 
A. Admit allegations contained in paragraphs one, 
two, three, and four of said Complaint. 
B. Deny allegations contained in paragraphs five, 
six, seven, eight, and nine of said Complaint. 
C. Defendants specifically allege that Maxfield at 
no time had any rightful interest in and to the said property, and 
that dealings between Romero and Maxfield were fraudulent in 
nature as a means of trying to prevent the State of Utah from 
knowing that Lester Romero was the true and correct fee title 
owner of said property. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendants pray that the Plaintiffs 
Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, the Plaintiff to bear all 
costs of this action. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
The Defendants, Owen Rushton and Carol Rushton, his wife, 
counterclaim against the Plaintiff as follows: 
1. Since October 1, 1980, the date said property was sold 
by Sheriff's Sale, the Plaintiff personally and by and through his 
agent, Lester Romero, have continually harrassed the tenants of 
the Plaintiff with respect to said premises, and have been 
wrongfully collecting the rents, thus depriving Rushton's, the 
owners of the property, the rents to which they are entitled. 
2. The Plaintiffs have received approximately $800.00 
in rents that is the property of the Defendants. Defendants have 
made demand for return of said rents, but the Plaintiff has 
refused to pay said rents over to the Defendants. 
3. The Defendants are entitled to receipt of the rents, 
improperly obtained by the Plaintiff, and are further entitled to 
an Order of this Court compelling the Plaintiff to refrain from in 
000054 
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HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE 6 VINCENT 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1100 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No. (801) 328-2506 
IN THE THIJtD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON, and 
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife, 
Defendants. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON, and 
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife, 
Third-Party P la in t i f f s , : 
vs. : 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through : 
Utah State Department of Social 
Services, : 
Third-Party Defendants. : Civil No. 80-8167 
The Defendants answer the Flaintiff's Complaint as follows!: 
1. That the Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a 
cause of action upon which relief can be granted, and therefore 
said Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. 
2. That the Plaintiff, Reed Maxfie3d has no interest 
in the real property which is the subject matter of this litigatioh 
in that the State of Utah, by and through the State Department 
of Social Services legally and lawfully sold said property by 
Sheriff's Sale on October 1, 1980 pursuant to a Judgment entered 
against Lester Romero, also known as Ralph G. Romero on June 29, 
1979 in case number 216937. Owen Rushton and Carol Rushton are 
the legal, lawful owners of said property pursuant to said 
Sheriff's Sale. 
000053 
I 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
ADDENDUM 
August 31, 198/. The lower court's dismissal in favor of 
Defendants Rushton and Third-Party Defendantsf State of Utah, 
should be sustained. 
DATED th; day of A p r i l , 1 9 8 8 . 
2PHEN G. SCHWENDIMAW K: Chief, Assistant Attorney General^ 
Tax & Business Regulation Div. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div. 
>^JEONARD E. MCGEE 
(
-^Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div. 
MILIN£_CERTIFIQA£E 
I certify that on this _£&_ day of April, 1988, I 
caused to be mailed, by deposit in the United States Mail, two 
copies of the foregoing Brief to the following: 
Lor in N. Pace 
350 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Henry S. Nygaard 
Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent 
330 North 3rd West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
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existed until six months from September 30, 1987 as set forth in 
the Order of Judge Young dated September 30, 1987. There is no 
reason to overturn the lower court* The decision should be 
affirmed. 
It is emphasized that in the original answer filed by 
Mr. Nygaard for Defendants at paragraphs 3 and 4.C. (R 54). 
Defendant Rushton's specifically allege that the conveyances by 
which Maxfield claimed his interest were fraudulent; that the 
Defendants Rushtons, and the Third-Party Defendant State of Utah, 
Co-Respondent have set this at issue in each of their pleadings 
and at all oral arguments the allegations that Maxfield had 
doubtful interest the properties in question though admitted 
recorded title. 
Appellants have wholly failed throughout this 
protracted litigation to prove their title and/or interest and 
were not prepared to do so on August 31, 1987, and Judge Young, 
based on the record and the statements at pre-trial, acted 
properly in dismissing said action. 
The dismissal of the case in its entirety by Judge 
Young leaves at rest this issue and all other factual disputes as 
Plaintiffs were not prepared for trial on September 15, 1987, as 
they were so ordered to be. This puts to rest the issue of 
Rushtons' proper interest in the real property as purchased at 
sale. This factual issue is not before the Court, nor should it 
be considered in this appeal. All issues in fact and law were 
dismissed, rightly, as to Plaintiffs at the pre-trial hearing on 
- 44 -
ownership prior to the transfer; (3) the State's judgment was 
obtained at a time when the property was in the name of Lester 
Romero on the records of the Salt Lake County Recorders Office. 
This Court should therefore sustain the actions of the 
Trial Judge in dismissing the matter for failure to prosecute as 
has been previously argued. In so doingf this issue is 
extinguished as an issue for the Court to consider. 
CONCLUSION 
This matter has been set for trial four times. 
Appellants continuously sought more time to prepare even to and 
including the Septemberf 1987 trial setting. At all times, the 
Defendants and Third-Party Defendant and Co-Respondents State of 
Utah were prepared to go to trial. The Trial Court did not abuse 
its discretion in dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. 
This court should affirm that decision. 
The Third District Courtfs denial of the Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the 27th day of March, 1981 by Judge James 
Sawaya and the subsequent answer filed by Respondent Rushtons', 
left the allegation of fraud as a factual issue to be determined 
at trial. This action on the part of the court was proper and 
should be sustained. 
Judge Sawaya1s Order of March 27, 1981, preserved to 
Appellant any right of redemption he may have in himself or 
through the original conveyor, Lester Romero or any of the 
alleged invalid corporate entities or partnerships through which 
Maxfield claims his chain of title, and that right of redemption 
- 43 -
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Reed R. Maxfield 
410 East 7620 South 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone 255-8465 
MAY 2 1 i987 
ourt 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OOOOO 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and 
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife, 
Defendants. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and 
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Third Party Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Third Party Defendant 
and Third Party 
Complainants, 
OBJECTION 
TO HEARING ON 
MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE 
TRIAL DATE 
AND 
ANY OTHER MOTIONS 
NOW PENDING 
Civil No. 80-8167 
Judge: David Young 
vs. 
.10 *»* \)t»*> 
S 8 l \ e s C . B n ^ - 8 f i ° n 
ut>^ 
txP^ e * : 
snsir?0~ 
vs. : 
REED MAXFIELD, t 
Plaintiff and Third : 
Party Defendant. 
The defendants# Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton, by 
and through their attorney, Henry S. Nygaard, move the court to 
set an immediate trial date in the above-entitled matter upon the 
grounds that the case has been pending since 1980. Furthermore, 
discovery has been completed and although the plaintiff, Reed 
Maxfield, has filed for protection under the bankruptcy laws of 
the United States, the Bankruptcy Court Judge John Allen has spe-
cifically lifted any stay of proceedings and has authorized the 
Third Judicial District Court to hear the above-entitled matter 
at its pleasure. 
DATED this Jl day of April, 1987. 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Hen/y (jL Nygaard 
Attorney for Defendants 
-2-
HENRY S . NYGAARD, ESQ. ( # 2 4 3 5 ) 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE 6 VINCENT 
Attorneys for Defendants 
333 North 300uWest 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Plaintiff# 
vs. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and 
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife, 
Defendants, 
: 
: 
: 
• 
• 
: 
MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE 
TRIAL DATE 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and 
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife, 
Third Party 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Third Party 
Defendant, 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Third Party Defendant : 
and Third Party 
Complainant, t 
Civil No. 80-8167 
Judge: David Young 
-1-
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS: 
County of Salt Lake ) 
ALICE ANDERSENf being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Beaslin, Nygaard, 
Coke & Vincent, attorneys for defendants and third party plain-
tiffs, Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton herein; that she served 
the attached Notice to Appoint Substitute Counsel upon the 
following individuals by placing a true and correct copy thereof 
in an envelope addressed to 
Reed Max field 
410 East 7620 South Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Lorin N. Pace, Esq. 
136 East South Temple 
1200 University Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Charles C. Brown, Esq. 
36 South State Street, #2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
William T. Thurman, Esq, 
Attorney at Law 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Stephen C. Schwendiman, Esq. 
130 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-
paid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on the 20th day of March, 1987. 
. _?IVA< (/^c/.a^ „ 
Subscribed and sworn to before'me this" 120thr^ day of 
March, 1987. ' ^ <L \ 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary(JPublic 
7/21/87 Residing at SaltLake City, UT 
HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. USB NO. 2435 
Attorney for 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
333 North 300 West Street 
Salt Lake City, Uah 84103 
Telephone No. 328-2506 
'9/ 
• / 
•; >,'-. IJT/.K 
it-f. :7 3? 
c^Xfcv^^—c**^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON, et ux., 
Defendants. 
NOTICE TO APPOINT 
SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL 
HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
Civil No. C-80-8167 
TO THE PLAINTIFF ABOVE NAMED: 
Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton, his wife, defendants 
and third party plaintiffs in the above entitled matter, hereby 
give notice to the plaintiff that they intend to press the above 
entitled matter to a conclusion, and therefore, plaintiff should 
appoint substitute counsel to represent him in this matter, or 
be prepared to appear personally. 
DATED this 20th day of March, 1987. 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
By. , /h.9fe*^ • 
Henry/S. Nygaard Attorney for Owen A. and 
Carol Rushton 
vs. 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Plaintiff and Third 
Party Defendant. 
Please be advised that Lorin N. Pace has withdrawn as 
counsel for the Plaintiff in the above entitled action. 
DATED this Lj day November, i966-r /<}£/ 
OuOi t^M 
Lorin ' N. Pace 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Notice of 
withdrawal of Attorney was mailed, postage pre-paid, to Charles C. 
Brown, Beneficial Life Tower #2000, '36 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111; William Thomas Thurman, Suite 1200 Kennecott 
Building, 10 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133; Stephen 
C. Schwendiman, Assistant Attorney General, 130 State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114; and to Henry S. Nygaard, 333 North 300 West 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103, this / day of 
/'/W I ^j ^ , *9efr. /<??? 
A^zX^^t^ 
2 
LHLJVJFL} | 
7.34 
Lorin N. Pace #2498 
PACE & BJORKLUND 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL 
OF ATTORNEY 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL : 
RUSHT0N, his wife. 
Defendants. Civil No. 80-8167 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and 
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Third Party Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH : 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, : 
Third Party Defendants : 
and Third Party 
Complainants, : 
1 
— ^-r>rt 
ni£:--.;:r,.r, , 
SA: : , '. ' \-e 
H.V? £ fj ls/!M«g7 
CM** ttfcyt^ 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing ORDER ON MOTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 
STATE OF UTAH TO LIFT A STAY was mailed first class, postage 
prepaid, to the following on this /(s day of February, 1987: 
Henry S. Nygaard, Esq. 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Douglas Cannon 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Reed R. Maxfield 
410 East 7620 South 
Midvale, UT 84017 
Charles C. Brown, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Brian Cannon 
210 Prowswood Plaza 
4885 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
William Thomas Thurman, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
Kennecott Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
f\ 
'WA 'In 
BERNARD M.[TANNER 
Ass i s tant Attorney Qeneral 
for the State of Utah 
hereby cc" ; ' v l :-r; ih? a-.r^xed and :oreooin& 
?. true £? : c o " : ' c" .• <:.' a document on 
o in the U.-. . .. ; L _- -^k.-uptcy Court 
r the District GJ •
 rt ^._ 
Datec:TEB2 5 W 
Attest: • 
Deputy Clerk 
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3. Tnat the State of Utah be granted a judgment 
evidencing tnat said execution and sale were proper* 
4. For such other and further relief as to the court 
seems proper. 
DATED this _.£:J day of 9 8 4 . 
TERNARD M. TANNE 
Ass i s tan t Attor 
J~SCHWENI>IMAU-
Ass i s tant Attorney General 
0002 
5. That on information and oelief, the Third-Party 
Defendant and Third-Party Claimant alleges they can produce a 
witness at trial who is prepared to testify tnat he spent more 
than four months attempting to find a person of Lee Flynn, an 
officer of Golden Circle, and that ne was unable to locate sucn a 
person, and on said representation, does not believe that Lee G. 
Flynn exists as an individual or as an officer of said Golden 
Circle Investment, the purported conveyor of title to Reed 
Maxfield, Plaintiff herein. 
6. Tnat based on the affidavit of Stephen G. 
Schwendiman, Assistant Actorney General, specifically paragraphs 
11 tnrougn 15, a question as to the validity of plaintiff's title 
and a question as to the validity of tne interest of Reed 
Maxfield, if any, in tne subject properties is raised as a 
serious question of fact and tne same is entitled to both 
discovery and strict proof at trial* 
7. Tnat it would be just and proper for plaintiff to 
nave tne burden to prove good title prior to establishing nis 
standing to sue as tne one proceeds the other. 
Wherefore Third-Party Defendant and Thira-Party 
Complainant prays for relief as follows: 
1. Tnat should the Rusnton's obtain judgment against 
the State of Utah, tnat the State of Utah would nave judgment 
over and against Reed Maxfield in total cased on a failure of 
good title in the Plaintiff, the moving party herein. 
2. That the State would be reimbursed for costs and 
attorneys fees for this action against Reed Maxfield, plaintiff 
herein, for an action brought without proper standing. 
000206 
COMES NOW Bernard M. Tanner, and Stephen G. 
Schwendiman, Assistant Attorneys General, on behalf of the State 
of Utah, by and through Utah State Department of Social Services, 
the Third-Party Defendant and Third-Party Complainant in this 
case, and amend their Third-Party Complaint as follows: 
1. That the State of Utah is entitled to judgment over 
and against Reed Maxfield, Plaintiff, if judgment against the 
State of Utah is taken by tne Rushtons* 
2. Tnat on information and belief, it is alleged that 
the transfer of wnatever interest the plaintiff, Reed Maxfield, 
obtained from Golden Circle Investment was not a bona fide 
transfer for value and was not a transfer of good title, and the 
same was invalid, and that the deed and existing evidence of 
payment of said deed are questionable if not fraudulent, and 
therefore the deed is not legal and the plaintiff, Reed Maxfield, 
nas no standing to bring this action* 
3. Tnat if said transfer is invalid as alleged on 
information and belief, the plaintiff does not have standing to 
sue in tnis case, and has no standing to allege any rignt, title, 
or interest in the property sold in case 216937 wherein the 
interest of Lester R. Romero was sold based on the judgment in 
tne aforementioned case. 
4. That based on the answer and counter-claim, there 
is no evidence as to questionable posting or improper sale as to 
the Colorado Street property, and this court should find that tne 
question, if any, as to improper sale attacnes solely to the 3020 
West 2995 South property. 
000^05 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
BERNARD M. TANNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
STEPHEN SCHWENDIMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: 533-5007 
PILED «N CLPRK'S OPPICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
^FP 2 4 1984 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL 
RUSHTON, h i s w i f e . 
Defendants. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL 
RUSHTON, h i s w i f e , 
vs . 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Utah State Department of Social 
Services, 
Third Party Defendants 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Utan State Department of Social 
Services, 
Third Party Defendant 
and Third Party Com-
plainant, 
vs« 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Plaintiff and 
Third Party Defendant 
AHfittDBf) THIRD PARTY 
COMPLAINT 
C i v i l Number 80-8167 
(JGUZ04 
Bankruptcy No. 84A-03391 
Bernard M. Tanner, Assistant Attorney General for the 
State of Utah, was heard on the motion. Henry Nygaard, Esq. 
appeared for the defendants in the state action previously filed 
by Mr. Maxfield. Charles Brown, Esq. appeared with Mr. Maxfield 
and represents Utah's Great Game Preserve as that interest may 
appear. After argument by all parties and the Court being fully 
apprised of the nature of the motion, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The motion to lift a stay is denied. 
2. As this is an action by the debtor as a party 
plaintiff against third parties, this claim was not subject to an 
automatic stay under Section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
3. The matter should be tried in state court where 
it commenced as there is no stay in Bankruptcy No. 84A-03391 
against Civil No. 80-8167 in the Third District Court for the 
State of Utah. £-£$-$1 
BY THE COURT: 
Bankruptcy Judge 
-2-
DAVID L. WILKINSON #3472 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN C. SCHWENDIMAN 12891 
Division Chief 
BERNARD M. TANNER #3185 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax t Business Regulation Div. 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Telephone: (801)533-5319 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
: Bankruptcy No. 84A-03391 
) (Chapter 11) 
IN THE MATTER OF REED R. : 
MAXFIELD, ) ORDER ON MOTION OF THE 
« DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 
Debtor. ) SERVICES, STATE OF UTAH TO 
: LIFT STAY 
This matter came before the Honorable John Allen, 
Bankruptcy Judge, February 20, 1987 at 4:18 p.m., and is amended 
to be in Bankruptcy No. 84A-03391 rather than 84A-00391 as noted. 
This is on a motion by the State of Utah, a third party defendant 
and third party complainant in a Third District Court case, Civil 
No. 80-8167, wherein Reed R. Maxfield, debtor in this case, is a 
party plaintiff. 
This proceeding was to request a lift of stay to allow 
an immediate trial of this matter in Third District Court of the 
State of Utah. 
FED 25 1987 
OFFICE Or JUDGE 
JOHN H. ALLEN 
Civil No. 80-8167 
Page 4 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing MOTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 
SERVICES, THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT AND THIRD PARTY COMPLAINANT, 
RENEWED REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE TRIAL AND MOTION TO DISMISS THE 
OBJECTION PREVIOUSLY FILED BY ATTORNEY CHARLES BROWN TO 
PROCEEDING WITH TRIAL was mailed first class, postage prepaid, to 
the following on this 4 o day of February, 1987: 
Henry S. Nygaard, Esq. 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Douglas Cannon 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Reed R. Maxfield 
410 East 7620 South 
Midvale, UT 84017 
Charles C. Brown, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Brian Cannon 
210 Prowswood Plaza 
4885 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
William Thomas Thurman, Esq, 
Attorney at Law 
Kennecott Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Wmpfl 
BERNARD M. TANNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
for the State of Utah 
Civil No. 80-8167 
Page 3 
Counsel respectfully requests the matter be set for 
hearing for argument on the day of March, 1987 in district 
court before the Honorable , 
Judge of the Third District Court so that a trial date may be set 
and further that the Court may rule on the motion of the State of 
Utah to dismiss the objection of Charles Brown, Attorney at Law, 
on behalf of parties as th^ir interest may appear. 
DATED this A ? day of February, 1987. 
BERNARD M. TANNI 
Assistant Attorney General 
Civil No. 80-8167 
Page 2 
Third Party s 
Defendant and ) 
Third Party : 
Complainant, ) 
vs. ) 
s 
REED R. MAXFIELD, ) 
Plaintiff and ) 
Third Party : 
Defendant. ) 
Comes now Bernard M. Tanner, Attorney for the State of 
Utahf Utah State Department of Social Services, and respectfully 
petitions the Court in this renewal of the motion of Defendants 
filed November 24, 1986, to proceed with trial and further, a 
motion to dismiss the objection to readiness for trial as 
previously filed by attorney Charles Brown for parties as his 
interest may appear. 
The basis for this renewal of our motion for immediate 
trial is that a motion for lifting stay in bankruptcy court was 
filed, a hearing was held on the 20th day of February, 1987 at 
4:20 p.m. before the Honorable John Allen, and based on the 
representations of the party the Court ruled that due to the fact 
that the motion in district court is by Reed Maxfield as a 
plaintiff against third parties not a party to the chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceeding he filed, that there is no automatic stay 
under Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON #3472 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN C. SCHWENDIMAN #2891 
Division Chief 
BERNARD M. TANNER #3185 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div. 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Telephone: (801)533-5319 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
REED R. MAXFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL 
RUSHTON, his wife, 
Defendants. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL 
RUSHTON, his wife, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through Utah State 
Department of Social 
Services, 
Third Party 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through Utah State 
Department of Social 
Services, 
Civil No. 80-8167 
MOTION OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 
SERVICES, THIRD PARTY 
DEFENDANT AND THIRD PARTY 
COMPLAINANT, RENEWED 
REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE TRIAL 
AND MOTION TO DISMISS THE 
OBJECTION PREVIOUSLY FILED 
BY ATTORNEY CHARLES BROWN 
TO PROCEEDING WITH TRIAL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ''}%*•' day of November, 1986, I 
caused to be mailed, first class postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Objection to Certification of 
Readiness for Trial to: 
Henry S. Nygaard 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
333 North 300 West Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
William T. Thurman 
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Suite 1200 Kennecott Bldg. 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Stephen C. Schwendiman 
Assistant Attorney General 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Lorin N. Pace 
University Club Bldg., #1200 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
4 
Great Game Preserves and counsel need to be finalized, 
DATED this -ffi day of November, 19 86. 
own 
3 
REED MAXFIELD, : 
Plaintiff and : 
Third Party Defendant. 
00O00 
Charles C. Brown as counsel for Utah's Great Game Preserves, 
a Chapter 11 debtor - for this purpose only files this objection: 
1) Reed Maxfield filed a Chapter 11 in 1985 and the 
confirmed Plan of Reorganization transfers this claim to Utahfs 
Great Game Preserves. 
2) A Motion to Amend Maxfield's pleadings was pending 
when Maxfield filed his petition. Before proceeding, the 
pleadings should be amended to add claims against the State and 
Stephen C. Schwendiman. 
3) Discovery is not complete. Depositions need to be 
taken of the secretary to Stephen C. Schwendiman, who is the 
daughter of the Rushtons who bought the homes at the Sheriff's 
sale conducted by Schwendiman. A deposition needs to be taken of 
the Sheriff serving the notices at the property. A deposition 
need to be taken of an assistant County Attorney having relevant 
knowledge of certain issues. Interrogatories need to be served 
and answered. Documents need to be produced. 
4) A stay in the Bankruptcy is effective to date. 
5) This attorney has not had time to familiarize 
himself with the case in order to have effective settlement 
discussions. Further, an agreement between Maxfield, Utah's 
2 
furfi ill GUMS 8MIC* 
Charles C. Brown 
Jeffrey B. Brown 
BROWN & BROWN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-9333 
? 
ILL . •-*~\TrY fUEllK 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OOOOO 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and 
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife, 
Defendants. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and 
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, 
OBJECTION TO 
CERTIFICATION OF 
READINESS FOR TRIAL 
Civil No.I 80-8167 
Third Party Defendants, 
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Third Party Defendant 
and Third Party 
Complainants, 
vs. 
for in Rule A.l of the Rules of Practice of the District and 
Circuit Courts, effective March 1, 1982. 
BY THE COURT 
-4-
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Reed R. Maxfield 
Plaintiff and 
third party defendant 
Reed Maxfield for tiimself files this objection: 
1. Reed Maxfield as a layman is not capable of properly 
defending this case himself and needs a Lawyer to do so. 
2. Reed Maxfield met with Loni F. Deland, Attorney at Law 
around the 1st of April 1967 and asked Mr. Deland to represent 
him in this case. I did leave my files with Mr. Deland and 
later obtained other exhibits he requested and then took those 
to his office. Mr. Deland informed me at that meeting he would 
be out of State on some other law suits off and on during April 
and he thought he could look my case over in a couple of weeks 
and would then let me know. He said from what I told him he 
probably would want the case. He did tell me he was booked with 
trials and case loads really heavy through June. 
3. However it was about the first week of May before he had a 
Mr. McRae, a 
and contacted 
and reviewing 
the knowledge 
even met with 
Lawyer from Vernal, Utah came to Salt Lake City 
me. I spent time on two different days going over 
the case with Mr. McRae. I was real pleased with 
Mr. Mcrae had from studying the case before I 
him the first day. Mr. Deland has not been able 
to personelly meet with me since our 1st meeting. 
4. Mr. Deland wrote me a letter dated May 13, 1987 (5 days 
ago) stating he and Mr. McRae had reviewed my file and had 
discussed the matter of representing me as per my request. And 
he stated they were willing to represent me on certain financial 
terms. 
5. I received that letter today Monday 18the May 1987. 
6. I was careful in representing my financial proposal to Mr. 
Deland in April concerning the paying for the cost of Attorney 
bills and court costs. The terms Mr. Deland presented in his 
letter of the 13th concerning their counter proposal of Attorney 
fees came to me as a surprise and was very different. 
7. I will (diligently) seek new council with (up most) speed if 
with in this week I cannot come to terras with Mr. McRae and Mr. 
Loni Deland on Attorney fees. 
8. I did by letter in April inform Mr. Nygaard that I had 
contacted Mr. Loni Deland and requested he represent me in this 
case. And it is only the (counter) offer they have made to my 
original proposal on paying their Attorney fees that is 
presently stopping their representing me in this case 
9. There is some very technical unfinished issues involved that 
a layman such as I could not begin to handle. Plus I need to 
amend ray Complaint. 
10 I will within 2 weeks notify both the court and Mr. Nygaard 
as to my progress. 
11. I, therefore request that the motion by Mr. Nygaard and 
any other pending motion be cancelled while I (speedily) obtain 
other legal council to represent me. 
Dated this 18 day of May 1987. 
Reed Maxfield 
Copy to Henry Nygaard. 
^^^) *2>yO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
7S>rfl 7 f t rH/^P 
" ' U : SCHEDULING ORDER AND 
P l a i n t i f f ( s ) , TRIAL NOTICE 
: 
A V8. CASE HO.^ft9-<f/<W 
Defendant(s). : 
Pursuant to the scheduling conference held on. 
the following dates were set and matters discussed: 
1. This case is set for trial on:SvpT/^ /UA /y/<?f~?CLJL//0:<?&<: 
2. Anticipated trial tine is 2> days.. 
3. This case is set for (non-jury^uryj^trial. If jury 
fee is not paid, it will be paid withinTCTdays of the date 
of this order by plaintiff/defendant. 
4. All discovery must be completed, including the filing 
of depositions with the Court by . 
5. A final pre-trial will be held before the Court on 
(tuo/,<^ &/ /<?<*-? at J^:nr> p . m . Counsel who will try 
the c&se are to be present. Clients or an individual with authority 
to settle the case are also to be present. 
6. Date to hear dispositive motions is %//n/X"7 . 
7. Other matters: 
8. The foregoing dates should be considered firm settings 
and will not be modified without Court order and then only upon 
a showing of manifest injustice. 
9. This order constitutes the only notice that the Court 
will send to counsel. 
Dated this / day of b>^^V--- , 19 <f 7 
DAVID S. YOUN 
DISTRICT COUR1 
Copies of this scheduling order were mailed to the following 
parties at the addresses indicated: 
Dated: U//?*? (LjLi "fL"^ 
COURT 0LERK 
Charles C. Brown (1447) 
Jeffrey B. Brown (0457) 
BROWN, SMITH & HANNA 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
City Centre I, Suite 401 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-5656 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REED MAXFIELD AND UTAHS' GREAT GAME 
PRESERVE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON, CAROL RUSHTON, et 
al. 
Defendants. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL RUSHTON, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through Utah 
State Department of Social Services, 
Third-Party Defendant and Third-
Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
TRIAL DATE OR IN 
ALTERNATIVE TO EXTEND 
DISCOVERY AND MOTION 
CUTOFF DATE 
Case No. 80-8167 
Judge David Young 
Come now plaintiffs, by and through counsel, and hereby move 
this court for an Order continuing the trial date in <> the above 
entitled matter for a period of approximately two months. 
Alternatively, plaintiffs move this court for an order allowing 
plaintiffs additional time past August 17, 1987 in which to 
finalize discovery. This motion is based upon the following 
reasons: 
1. Although the case is very old, and has been stayed due 
to the filing of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petitions by plaintiffs, 
present counsel for plaintiffs only recently became involved. 
2. Counsel for plaintiffs have several Bankruptcy Court 
trials set for trial in September, 1987, which trial dates have 
been pending for many months, if not years, and which would be 
inconvenient to reschedule. Additionally, this courts/recently 
set for trial in October a large case involving counsel, and 
extensive preparation is needed to be ready to try that case. 
3. Present counsel has served Interrogatories, Requests for 
Admissions and Requests for Production of Documents upon all 
parties in the lawsuit, which were served July 15, 1987. 
Responses to said discovery are due Friday, August 14, 1987. 
Presently, this would only allow for completion of discovery by 
way of depositions based upon said Interrogatories and Requests 
on Monday, August 17, 1987, one business day after the responses 
are due. If the responses are not provided timely or are 
evasive, no additional discovery could be completed. 
4. Plaintiffs intend to file an amended complaint on or 
before August 17, 1987 naming additional defendants. Time should 
be allowed for said defendants to be served, to answer, and to 
participate in discovery* Further, the amended complaint may 
raise new allegations and causes against the present parties to 
the lawsuit, and additional discovery based upon that may be 
necessary. Additionally, by order of court, plaintiffs were to 
file a reply to Rushtonfs Amended Answer and Counterclaim. 
Plaintiffs have filed herewith a Motion to Dismiss all claims 
based upon representations made to the Bankruptcy Court that no 
claims were made against plaintiffs in this case, in order to 
obtain relief from the automatic stay in order that this matter 
could proceed. Depending upon the outcome of that motion, some 
discovery or additional time to plead should be allowed. 
5. Plaintiffs intend to finalize the depositions of the 
Rushtons and to take depositions of Lyle Summers and several 
Deputy Sheriffs. Plaintiffs should be allowed some additional 
time to do this. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs move this court for an order 
continuing the trial dates in this matter, presently set for 
September 15, 16 and 17, 1987, for a period of approximately two 
months. Alternatively, plaintiffs move this court for an order 
allowing additional time past August 17, 1987 in which time to 
conduct discovery. 
DATED this ///—day of August, 1987. 
/%M* 
jeffreY/B^. Brown 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the ID— day of August, 1987, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be hand-
delivered to: 
Henry S. Nygaard 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Bernard Tanner 
130 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
motrusht.uta 
DAVID L. WILKINSON #3472 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN C. SCHWENDIMAN #2891 
Division Chief 
BERNARD M. TANNER #3185 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div. 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Telephone: (801)533-531S 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
In Re REED R. MAXFIELD, 
Debtor. 
REED R. MAXFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL 
RUSHTON, his wife, 
Defendants. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL 
RUSHTON, his wife, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through Utah State 
Department of Social 
Services, 
Third Party 
Defendants. 
Bankruptcy No. 84A-00391 
AMENDED PETITION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND 
THROUGH TtfE UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 
SERVICES, THIRD PARTY 
DEFENDANT AND THIRD PARTY 
COMPLAINANT, REQUEST FOR 
IMMEDIATE TRIAL OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE FOR A LIFT OF 
STAY TO ALLOW FOR TRIAL OF 
THE PROCEEDING IN STATE 
DISTRICT COURT IN CIVIL NO. 
80-8167 
oo 036* 
STATE OP UTAH, by and t 
through Utah State ) 
Department of Social t 
Services, ) 
s 
Third Party ) 
Defendant and : 
Third Party ) 
Complainant, : 
) 
vs. : 
) 
REED R. MAXFIELD, t 
) 
Plaintiff and : 
Third Party ) 
Defendant. : 
) 
Comes now Bernard M. Tanner, Attorney for the State of 
Utah, appearing in this case as third party defendant and third 
party complainant in adversary proceeding and respectfully 
petitions the Court that the matter be set immediately for trial 
before this bankruptcy court or in the alternative that the stay 
would be lifted to the degree that the parties may be allowed, 
with the permission of the bankruptcy judge, to try this matter 
at the earliest moment in Third District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, under the existing civil no. 80-8167, 
the case number and location for the intended trial prior to the 
filing of this bankruptcy proceeding. 
It is alleged by counsel for the state tha^ it is in 
the best interest of the parties to have a rapid trial of the 
-2- t^£9 
remaining issues relative to the validity of the sheriff's sale 
which occurred as subject of this case in Third District Court 
and that it would be to the best interest of all parties 
concerned to so proceed. 
DATED this ~ day of February) 1987. 
ERNARD M. TURNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
for the State of Utah 
Third Party Defendant and 
Third Party Complainant 
-3- 0003^ 
DAVID L. WILKINSON #3472 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN #2891 
Chief, Assistant Attorney General 
BERNARD M. TANNER #3185 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Division 
Room 130 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone : (801) 533-5319 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REED KAXFIELD AND UTAHS' GREAT ] 
GAME PRESERVE, 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
v s . 
OWEN A. RUSHTON, CAROL RUSHTON, 
e t a l . , 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL RUSHTON, ] 
Third-Party P l a i n t i f f s , ] 
v s . 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Utah State Department of Soc ia l 
S e r v i c e s , 
Third-Part Defendants 
and Third-Party 
P l a i n t i f f , ] 
v s . 
> OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO CONTINUE, OR IN 
> THE ALTERNATIVE, TO EXTEN 
DISCOVERY AND MOTION 
> CUT-OFF DATE 
> Case No. 80-8167 
i Hon. David Young, J u d g e 
REED MAXFIELD, ) 
Third-Party Defendant. ) 
Comes now Bernard M. Tanner* Attorney for State of 
Utah, by and through Utah Department of Social Services, Third-
Party Defendant and Third-Party Plaintifff and objects to the 
contents of the Motion as being factually inaccurate, failing to 
state a proper basis, and failing to give proper notice to 
parties, and hereby requests the same be dismissed and/or, in the 
alternative, that the same be set for hearing on August 24, 1987, 
at 9:00 a.m., before the Honorable Judge David Young. 
DATED this 11th day of August,. 1987 
QM/ 
BERNARD M. TANNER^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State of Utah 
- 2 
HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. (Bar No. 2435) 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Attorneys for Owen A. RUshton and Carol Rushton 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
REED MAXFIELD AND UTAH'S 
GREAT GAME PRESERVE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON, CAROL RUSHTON, 
et al, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS RUSHTON 
OBJECT TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
DATE OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
TO EXTEND DISCOVERY AND 
MOTION CUT-OFF DATE 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL 
RUSHTON, 
Third Party 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Utah State Department of Social 
Services, 
Third Party Defendant 
and Third Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Third Party Defendant. 
Civil No. C80-8167 
Judge: David Young 
-1 
The defendants Rushton, by and through their attorney, 
Henry S. Nygaard of the law firm of Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke 6 
Vincent, object to the Notice of Hearing of plaintiffs' Motions to 
Continue Trial Date or Extend Discovery and Motion Cut-Off Dates 
and on Motion to Dismiss all Claims Against Plaintiffs set for 
August 17, 1987, at 9:00 a.m. upon the grounds that the Motions 
ultimately are in the nature of summary disposition of this 
matter, and the defendants are entitled to ten (10) days notice 
pursuant to the rules of Utah Civil Procedure. 
Furthermore, defendants1 Motions presently before the 
court are set for hearing on August 24, 1987, at 9:00 a.m., which 
would be a more appropriate date for all of the parties to argue 
all motions now before the court. 
DATED this // day of August, 1987. 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Henry S/Nygaard 
Attorney for Owen A. Rushton and 
Carol Rushton 
-2-
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DAVID L. WILKINSON #3472 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN J. SORENSON #3049 
Chief, Assistant Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
BERNARD M. TANNER #3185 
Assistant Attorney General 
LEONARD E. McGEE #2185 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for the State of Utah 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 533-5261 
FILED IN CtERK'S OFFICE 
SALT LAKE: C O U H T T . U T A H 
AUG?I 4usPM*87 
II ai*0h' KlHDlCr CLERK 
3-c 0 1 ^ 1 COURT **""• • 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REED MAXFIELD AND UTAHS' GREAT 
GAME PRESERVE, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON. CAROL RUSHTON, 
e t a l . , 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
OWEN A RUSHTON and CAROL RUSHTON, 
T h i r d - P a r t y P l a i n t i f f s , 
v . 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Utah State Department of Social 
Services, 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Third-Party Plaintiff, 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Third-Party Defendant . 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
C i v i l No. C80-8167 
JUDGE DAVID YOUNG 
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COMES NOW the Defendant's and hereby object to the 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint, filed on August 17, 
1987. The grounds for said objection are as follows: 
1) The Statute of Limitations on the Causes of Action 
have run; 
2) The Defendant's are prejudiced in that the 
Plaintiff has added additional parties, new causes of action, new 
prayers for relief, the time for discovery in the case has 
passed, and a firm trial date has been set within 30 days of the 
proposed amendment; 
3) The Defendant's have filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment based on the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint; 
4) The time for new motions has passed, which precludes 
the Defendant's from further dispositive motions; 
5) The Courts' Order of June 8, 1987 bars further 
motions, amendments to pleadings and discovery subsequent to 
August 17, 1987. The Plaintiff has not timely filed a Motion to 
Amend with the Court. 
6) The Plaintiff has had ample opportunity to have 
timely filed Amended Complaints, in that this matter has been 
betore the Court for nearly seven years. 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
This is to certify that I hand-delivered a copy of the 
foregoing DEFENDANTS OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT 
to the following this 21st day of August, 1987. 
Charles C. Brown, Esq. 
Jetfrey B. Brown, Esq. 
Brown, Smith & Hanna 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
City Centre I, Suite 401 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Henry S. Nygaard, Esq. 
Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent 
Attorneys for Rushtons 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE COMES NOW ON REGULARLY BEFORE THE COURT FOR 
E-TRIAL CONFERENCE. COUNSEL APPEARING AS NOTED ABOVE. 
WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING ISSUES ARE DISCUSSED BETWEEN RESPECTIVE COUNSEL 
D THE COURT. THE COURT NOW ORDERS THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE BE SET FOR THE 
LLOWING (SEE BELOW) OR SETTLED. . 
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BROWN, SMITH 6 HANNA 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
City Centre I, Suite 401 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-5656 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT Office 0f AT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON, CAROL RUSHTON, et 
al. 
Defendants. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL RUSHTON, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through Utah 
State Department of Social Services, 
Third-Party Defendant and Third-
Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
COME NOW Charles C. Brown and Jeffrey B. Brown, attorneys 
for Reed Maxfield in the above-captioned case, and hereby move 
this court pursuant to Rule 2.8, Rules of Practice for the 
District and Circuit Courts of Utah, for an Order allowing their 
withdrawal as counsel on behalf of Reed Maxfield. Trial is 
jr.' 
r -:,- oi'-
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
Case No. 80-8167 
Judge David Young 
presently set for September 15, 1987. This Motion is based upon 
the following grounds and upon the Affidavit of Jeffrey B. Brown 
filed herewith: 
1. There is an Attorney Lien in this case filed by Lorin 
Pace. Current counsel agreed to appear in this case provided 
that Mr. Maxfield would obtain from Lorin Pace a Release of the 
Attorney's Lien. Mr. Maxfield agreed to do this, and has 
repeatedly represented that he has obtained said Release and 
would provide it to present counsel, but, contrary to said 
agreement and representations, he has not obtained or provided 
said Release of Attorney's Lien. It would severely jeopardize 
the efforts of attorneys herein and would jeopardize the 
possibilities of them being paid for their efforts to require 
their continuance with said Attorney Lien in place. 
2. Current counsel agreed to enter into the case only upon 
the express understanding and agreement that Mr. Maxfield would 
sign a Fee Agreement secured by real property. Pursuant thereto, 
a Fee Agreement was prepared and documents necessary to pledge 
real property were provided to Mr. Maxfield in early June, 1987, 
immediately upon counsel coming into the case. • Mr. Maxfield 
indicated that he would sign the Fee Agreement and pledge the 
real property. From time to time, at the request of current 
counsel that these documents be provided, Mr. Maxfield has 
repeatedly indicated that the Fee Agreement and security on real 
property had been signed but that he did not have them in his 
possession but he would obtain the same. He has still not 
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provided these to current counsel. 
3. On Friday, August 28, 1987, secretary for counsel 
telephoned Mr. Maxfield to remind him of the time of the Pre-
Trial Conference and also to remind him to provide to counsel the 
Attorney Release of Lien, the signed Fee Agreement and the 
security on real property during the morning of August 31, 1987. 
To this request, Mr. Maxfield agreed. 
4. Despite said agreement, as of the time of the Pre-Trial 
Conference, Mr. Maxfield has failed to provide counsel with the 
Attorney Release of Lien, the Fee Agreement and the security on 
real property. Instead, after the telephone conference Mr. 
Maxfield delivered letters to current counsel expressing his 
displeasure with current counsels' handling of the case. 
5. As a result thereof, current counsel has no Fee 
Agreement with Mr. Maxfield and cannot agree with Mr. Maxfield as 
to how the case should be handled. Mr. Maxfield has written 
several letters indicating his displeasure with the way counsel 
is handling his case and has expressed a dissatisfaction with 
current counsel. 
6. Current counsel agreed to the early trial setting in 
September based upon stipulation of opposing counsel that we 
could file an Amended Complaint on or before August 17, 1987, 
At the time of that stipulation, opposing counsel did not express 
any concern about new parties who might be brought in or 
additional discovery that might be made and therefore current 
counsel was not concerned about it. However, upon filing the 
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Amended Complaint opposing counsel objected, contrary to earlier 
agreement, and the filing of the Amended Complaint has been 
denied by this court. Trying the case under an Amended Complaint 
was one of the basic reasons for entering the case, which has 
been denied. 
7. Current counsel understood they would be handling this 
case strictly as a claim by plaintiff to obtain assets for the 
estate from defendants and would not be defending plaintiff from 
any counterclaims of defendants, based upon the Relief from Stay 
obtained from the Bankruptcy Court and based upon representations 
made by opposing counsel to the Bankruptcy Court Judge. Pursuant 
thereto, current counsel filed Motions to Dismiss the 
Counterclaims of the defendants against plaintiff which Motion 
was denied. This reason upon which counsel came into the case 
has also been removed. 
WHEREFORE, these attorneys respectfully request that the 
court allow their withdrawal as counsel on behalf of Mr. Maxfield 
based upon the foregoing factors. It would be highly prejudicial 
to current counsel to be required to continue through the case 
given the disagreements between Mr. Maxfield, given the promises 
which have been breached, given the fact that counsel have not 
been able to obtain, despite diligent efforts and repeated 
requests, a signed Fee Agreement secured by property which was 
the basic understanding that counsel had with Mr. Maxfield upon 
entering this case. 
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u ^ : . DATED this %r^ day of August, 1987. 
BROWN, SMITH & HANNA 
Charles C. Brown, Esq. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
TTgl 
I hereby certify that on the O ^ day of August, 1987, 
I mailed, first class postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to: 
Henry S. Nygaard 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Bernard Tanner 
130 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Reed Maxfield 
410 East 7620 South 
Midvale, Utah #2047 
mot2rush.max 
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